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A MATTER OF TRUST:
SHOULD NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES BAR
CLAIMS FOR FRAUDULENT
INDUCEMENT OF CONTRACT?
ALLEN BLAIR*
In this Article, Professor Allen Blair examines the enforceability of no-reliance clauses-
contractual disclaimers designed to prevent parties from relying on extra-contractual
representations to prove fraudulent inducement claims. Many courts are skeptical of such
disclaimers and either refuse to enforce them or will enforce them only subject to substantial
restrictions. These courts base their decisions on generic moral prohibitions against lying. This
Article argues, however, that these courts reach their conclusion too easily. They presume that
no-reliance clauses can serve no legitimate contract function and thus never provide value to
parties. But, in at least some cases between sophisticated parties, no-reliance clauses can-and
do-serve valuable contract functions. With the core assumption made by the majority of
courts reluctant to enforce no-reliance clauses dispelled, this Article suggests that at least the
generic formulations of a moral prohibition against fraud are insufficient to counterbalance the
value gained by autonomous parties choosing what they rationally believe to be in their own
best interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The liar, and only the liar, is invariably and universally
despised, abandoned, and disowned.'
Who or what can you trust when deciding whether or not to enter
into a contract? According to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
what contracting parties can trust-what they should trust-is the
written language of the contract.2 After all, the Seventh Circuit reminds
us, "[m]emory plays tricks. . . .Prudent people protect themselves
against the limitations of memory (and the temptation to shade the
truth) by limiting their dealings to those memorialized in writing."3
Consequently, in the Seventh Circuit's view, contractual disclaimers
designed to prevent parties from relying on extra-contractual
1. 2 Samuel Johnson, The Adventurer, in THE YALE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF
SAMUEL JOHNSON 362 (W. J. Bate, John M. Bullitt & L. F. Powell eds., 1963).
2. See Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 2000).
3. Id.
[92:423
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representations should be enforced.4 In the face of such disclaimers-
what I will refer to as "no-reliance " 5-neither party should be
able to maintain that it was fraudulently induced 6 to enter into the
4. Id.
5. These sorts of clauses are also commonly referred to as "anti-reliance clauses" or
"waivers of reliance clauses." See, e.g., Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004)
("[F]or a contract to bar a fraud in the inducement claim, the contract must contain language
that, when read together, can be said to add up to a clear anti-reliance clause by which the
plaintiff has contractually promised that it did not rely upon statements outside the contract's
four corners in deciding to sign the contract." (emphasis added)). These clauses are also
sometimes called "big boy" clauses. See, e.g., Extra Equipamentos e Exportaq~o Ltda. v.
Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) ("In the trade, no-reliance clauses are called 'big
boy' clauses (as in 'we're big boys and can look after ourselves')."). For the purposes of this
Article, I will use the term "no-reliance clause" descriptively to include any contractual clause
or set of clauses aimed at disclaiming or limiting liability for fraudulent representations made
during precontractual negotiations.
Such clauses should be distinguished from generic merger or integration clauses because,
as discussed in detail in Part III, some courts impose stringent normative requirements on no-
reliance clauses, maintaining that they must be set apart from standard merger clauses, must
not be, themselves, boilerplate, or must particularly disclaim the alleged misrepresentations.
Additionally, no-reliance clauses should be distinguished from clauses that operate to bar or
limit claims for fraud based on representations made within the contract. See generally, e.g.,
Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006). In Abry,
the contract at issue contained a number of interlocking provisions designed to limit the
plaintiff's post-closing recourse against the defendant. Id. at 1044-45. The particular
provisions at issue, however, stated that, with respect to breaches of (or noncompliance with)
any representations or warranties actually inside the Purchase Agreement, the plaintiff could
recover only up to $20 million in damages. Id. at 1044. While stating in dicta that no-reliance
clauses purporting to bar reliance on representations made outside of the contract would be
enforceable, id. at 1041, the court in Abry determined that there were no legitimate
justifications for a seller to seek protection for intentional lies that it makes about facts
contained in a contract, id. at 1036 ("[I]t is difficult to identify an economically-sound
rationale for permitting a seller to deny [a remedy] to a buyer when the seller is proven to
have induced the contract's formation or closing by lying about a contractually-represented
fact."). While I believe that the Abry court's distinction is suspect, I limit my analysis in this
Article to no-reliance clauses that focus on precontractual representations.
6. This Article will consider only contractual disclaimers of alleged misrepresentations
that form the predicates of fraudulent inducement claims. Fraud in the factum, or fraud in
the execution, as it is sometimes called, presents a different set of problems.
Misrepresentations constituting fraud in the inducement lead "'a party to assent to something
he otherwise would not have; [misrepresentations constituting fraud in the factum] induce[] a
party to believe the nature of his act is something entirely different than it actually is."'
Connors v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 490 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Southwest Adm'rs,
Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, "'[flraud in the
[factum] arises when a party executes an agreement with neither knowledge nor reasonable
opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms .... Fraud in the
[factum] results in the agreement being void ab initio, whereas fraud in the inducement makes
the transaction merely voidable."' Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d at 490 (quoting Rozay's
Transfer, 791 F.2d at 774) (citation omitted); see also Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220
F.3d 99, 109-10 (3d Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between fraud in the inducement and fraud in
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contract.7 A growing number of courts agree with the Seventh Circuit
and enforce, without significant restriction, no-reliance clauses to defeat
claims of fraudulent inducement.8
Many courts, however, disagree.9 Following the traditional view that
fraud vitiates all that it touches, ' ° some courts categorically refuse to
enforce no-reliance clauses, leaving contracting parties exposed to
intentional fraud claims. For instance, in the California Court of
Appeals' view,
[a] party to a contract who has been guilty of fraud in its
inducement cannot absolve himself from the effects of
his fraud by any stipulation in the contract, either that no
representations have been made, or that any right which
might be grounded upon them is waived."
Other courts will sometimes enforce no-reliance clauses, but only with
significant restrictions. 2
the execution); Cancanon v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 805 F.2d 998, 1000 (11th
Cir. 1986) ("Where misrepresentation of the character or essential terms of a proposed
contract occurs, [i.e., fraud in the factum,] assent to the contract is impossible. In such a case
there is no contract at all."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 cmt. a (1991)
(same).
7. See, e.g., Extra Equipamentos e ExportaqIo Ltda., 541 F.3d at 724 ("No-reliance
clauses serve a legitimate purpose in closing a loophole in contract law (thus resisting, in
Judge Kozinski's colorful expression, the metastasizing of contract law into tort law ... ).")
(citation omitted); Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644-45
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating, in dicta, that the logic of Rissman should apply outside of the
securities context, and no-reliance clauses should be allowed to bar fraudulent inducement
claims).
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part II.A and B.
10. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Carpenter, 554 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1976) ("[A] contract with an
innocent principal [can] be rescinded on the basis of the fraudulent representations of his
agent despite a disclaimer clause because the fraud complained of vitiates the entire
transaction, including the disclaimer clause." (quotation omitted)); Pearson & Son, Ltd. v.
Dublin Corp. [1907] A.C. 351, 362 (H.L) (appeal taken from Ir.) ("[F]raud vitiates every
contract and every clause in it.").
11. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d
783, 788 n.7 (1995) (favorably quoting 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
CONTRACTS §130 410, 368-69 (9th ed. 1987)). But see Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr., 37
Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 372 (2005) (stating that the Ron Greenspan rule "does not mean the
contract provision is in every case irrelevant" and concluding that a particularized no-reliance
clause sufficed as evidence that plaintiff did not rely on defendant's statements).
12. See infra Part It.B.
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The upshot is that courts and commentators addressing the
enforceability of no-reliance clauses have a long history of disagreeing."
Opposing arguments get framed between two familiar poles: freedom of
contract and the moral repugnance of fraud. So framed, the
disagreement about the enforceability of no-reliance clauses invokes an
ancient divide in our jurisprudence between contract and tort law.
Mapping this divide, however, has famously been fraught with
difficulty. It represents a conflict between sometimes competing
primary principles, one of which must take priority in a given instance."
On the one hand, the law should encourage people to be diligent in
protecting their own interests and respect their choices with regard to
such matters; on the other hand, the law should encourage honesty and
fair dealing in business transactions. 6 Conflicts between these primary
13. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, 117 YALE L.J. 2, 6
(2007) ("There is a longstanding debate within the courts and legal scholarship about whether
parties should be able to contract out of liability for their fraudulent misrepresentations.").
Professor Klass cites two examples of recent scholarship on this issue: Kevin Davis, Licensing
Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-Contractual Misrepresentations, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 507-13 (1999) (arguing that no-reliance clauses can best be justified as
mechanisms for reducing agency costs in contractual negotiations); and Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments, and Half-Truths: Business Acquisition Agreements and the
Right To Lie, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 431, 449 (2007) (urging adoption of a rule that allows no-
reliance clauses to the extent that extra-contractual representations conflict with a contractual
representation or the contract is silent about the subject matter of the extra-contractual
representation). Klass, supra, at 6 n.5.
14. In 1953, for instance, Professor William Prosser stated that "the borderland of tort
and contract, and the nature and limitations of the tort action arising out of a breach of
contract are poorly defined." WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and
Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380,452 (1953); see also, e.g., Thomas
C. Galligan, Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV.
457, 458-60 (1994) (describing the challenges of drawing boundaries between tort and
contract); Richard E. Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 163, 164-66
(1983) (tracing the uncertain and often confusing historic distinctions between tort and
contract).
15. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-91 (1961) (explaining that primary
principles are beliefs or moral obligations shared by a relatively homogenous society); see also
Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 68 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (noting that formalist criticisms of the
unconscionability doctrine require "direct application of a moral theory, rather than the
application of second-order rules").
16. Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 405, 407. William Powers, Jr. describes the differences between torts and
contracts as follows: "The tort paradigm reflects the ideology and rhetoric of
reasonableness .... The contract paradigm reflects the ideology of freedom and consent and
carries the principles of autonomy, individuality, and privacy into commerce via the market."
William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1209, 1213-14 (1994); see also Alloway v.
Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 268 (N.J. 1997) ("Implicit in the distinction [between
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principles have often left a trail of analytical confusion in their wake and
given little practical guidance to contracting parties.
This Article aims to help clear such confusion, at least with respect
to no-reliance clauses contained in commercial contracts between
sophisticated parties. 7 I contend that an analysis of the enforceability of
no-reliance clauses should begin by examining a core puzzle: why would
any rational party' 8 in an arms-length contract ever agree to a provision
contract and tort] is the doctrine that a tort duty of care protects against the risk of accidental
harm and a contractual duty preserves the satisfaction of consensual obligations." (citations
omitted)); Dailey, supra, at 407 n.6 (discussing this historic tension and citing several cases in
which courts advocated for honesty and fair dealing and several cases in which courts
advocated for prudent business decisions). So framed, the tensions between the paradigms
are evident and have been much discussed. E.g., Daniel Markovits, Making and Keeping
Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV. 1325, 1326-27 (2006) (stating that arguments about these
differences "have recently received extensive attention under a variety of headings-
including the rise of the welfare state, the tortification of contract law, and the development
of a discourse of anticommodification" (footnotes omitted)).
17. In this Article, I focus exclusively on contracts between sophisticated parties with
relatively equal bargaining power. No-reliance clauses may well present particular concerns
in consumer contracts or contracts involving radically disparate bargaining power.
Accordingly, I take no position in this Article on the enforceability of no-reliance clauses in
such contracts, opting instead to distinguish, at least roughly, between consumer contracts and
commercial contracts. See, e.g., All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 866
(7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing a distinction between "commercial contracting parties" and
"consumers, and other individuals not engaged in business" for the purposes of the potential
application of the economic loss doctrine to bar claims of fraud); Avery Wiener Katz, The
Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 538
(2004) (noting that "distinctions [are] drawn in the case law and in the commentary between
different sorts of contracts; it is generally acknowledged that formalism is relatively more
important to experienced commercial actors, and substantive interpretation better suited to
transactions involving consumers and other amateurs," but also noting that no systematic
attempt to draw this distinction exists in domestic contract law); Robert E. Scott, The Law
and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANNU. REV. L. & SOC. Sci. 279, 281 (2006)
("Contracts involving individual consumers raise separate issues that challenge the
assumption that their commitments are voluntary, rational and informed."); William J.
Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf Between "Consumer" and
"Nonconsumer" Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 244 (1997) ("Nobody doubts
any longer that 'consumer contracts' are different from fully negotiated contracts of the
classical model. Consumers are seldom represented by lawyers in their contractual dealings,
and we tend to think that, as a group, they have a lower level of legal sophistication than
those with whom they typically make contracts.").
18. Contracting parties, I assume, are rational in the sense that they only enter into
contracts that they believe will make them better off. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 17, at 280
(assuming that contracting parties "act rationally, within the constraints of their environment,
in the sense that they wish to contract if they believe the arrangement will make them better
off and not otherwise"); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 602 (1990) ("If we assume rationality, then it
follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes of particular parties, the dominant strategy for
contractual risk allocation is to maximize the expected value of the contract for both parties.
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limiting or eliminating her recovery in cases when the other party
intentionally lies to her?19 This puzzle is particularly interesting
considering that many commercial contracts contain these clauses.'
Courts on both ends of the enforcement spectrum, however, have
avoided consideration of this puzzler. Courts reluctant to enforce no-
reliance clauses avoid the puzzle by either explicitly or implicitly
assuming that no-reliance clauses have no legitimate value for
contracting parties. Such clauses are mere licenses to lie.2  With this
assumption in place, courts easily justify their decision not to enforce
no-reliance clauses, or to enforce them only subject to significant
restrictions, by parroting generic notions that lying and fraud are
morally reprehensible. After all, if the parties gain no legitimate value
from no-reliance clauses,23 then freedom of contract with respect to such
clauses has no moral or practical weight. It takes only a modest
Only by allocating risks in order to maximize the joint expected benefits from their
contractual relationship can the parties hope to maximize their individual utility.").
19. This is precisely the sort of puzzle that occupies Professor Victor Goldberg's
energies in his recent book. VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (2006). In his book, Professor Goldberg advances a brand of
economic analysis that eschews formal modeling, preferring instead to focus tightly on the
transaction. Professor Goldberg suggests that by asking, "Why might reasonable, profit-
seeking actors structure their relationship in a particular way?," id. at 2, economic analysis
can offer insights into not only contract interpretation but also contract rules, both mandatory
and default, see id.
20. Davis, supra note 13, at 485 ("Disclaimers of liability for pre-contractual
misrepresentations are common features of all kinds of contracts, ranging from the complex
agreements of purchase and sale used in connection with the acquisition of businesses, to
contracts for the sale or the lease of consumer goods.").
21. See infra Part III.
22. This phrase was first used by Professor Kevin Davis when discussing no-reliance
clauses. See Davis, supra note 13, at 485. Professor Davis, however, advances several
compelling arguments favoring the enforcement of no-reliance clauses. See id.
23. The term "value" is being used in its most capacious sense. This Article assumes
that "[h]uman beings value goods, things, relationships, and states of affairs in diverse ways."
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 782
(1994) (citing ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 8-11 (1993)).
Thus, it assumes that values are plural and that they cannot be reduced to and compared
along a single unitary metric. See id. at 784 (arguing that "[d]ifferent kinds of valuation
cannot without significant loss be reduced to a single 'superconcept,' like happiness, utility, or
pleasure"); see also Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of
the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 1185, 1185 (1998) (describing advocates
of this position as arguing "that people can choose among options, but that the choice
depends on qualitative differences between options that cannot be reduced to vectors on a
single dimension of evaluation").
24. For an example of a powerful justification for courts interfering with the choices that
contracting parties might make about the design of their contracts when that design does not
serve legitimate economic goals, see generally Robin West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice:
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argument against these clauses to justify a refusal to enforce them. But
courts that do enforce no-reliance clauses without significant restrictions
have, in the main, also failed to address this puzzle, rehearsing instead
superficial freedom-of-contract rationales that fail to meet the concerns
of courts in the opposing camp.
While I ultimately suggest that no-reliance clauses should be
enforced without significant restrictions, my primary goal is not to
advocate for one rule or another.25 Instead, my primary goal is to
advance the debate about the enforceability of no-reliance clauses. 26 I
argue that courts reluctant to enforce no-reliance clauses rest their
The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99
HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
25. The question of whether no-reliance clauses should be enforced can be thought of as
a choice about whether prohibitions against fraud should constitute mandatory or default
rules. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989). Contracting parties may freely opt out
of default rules. See id. Unlike default rules, however, mandatory rules may not be varied or
waived by contracting parties, even if both would choose to do so. See id. Mandatory rules
impose standards of procedural or substantive fairness on the parties. These bargaining
constraints may be
justified either by "externalities" or "paternalism" in that lawmakers
might make rules mandatory to protect people not in contractual privity
(e.g., as in the mandatory prohibition of criminal conspiracies) or to
protect people who are parties to the contract itself (e.g., as in the
mandatory prohibition against contracting with infants).
Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 897, 901 (1999).
26. I subscribe to the notion that the primary goal of contract law should be to achieve
efficiency goals and thereby maximize social welfare gains. While I recognize that there are
other goals that contract law might serve, I do not, in this Article, revisit the debate on the
propriety of using efficiency analysis. For a discussion of criticisms of the selection of
efficiency as the goal to be achieved by contract rules, see Richard Craswell, The Relational
Move: Some Questions From Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 91,100 (1993).
Instead, this Article is written in the spirit of Professor Cass Sunstein's call to recognize the
plurality of values in order to more clearly see what is at stake in the adoption of one legal
rule or another. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 782. As Professor Sunstein points out,
to see values as incommensurable, and to say that people are really
disputing appropriate kinds (not levels) of valuation, is not by itself to
resolve legal disputes. It is necessary to say something about the right
kind-to offer a substantive theory-and to investigate the particulars in
great detail, in order to make progress in hard cases in law. But an
understanding of problems of incommensurability will make it easier to
see what is at stake.
Id. This Article endeavors to encourage a more detailed investigation of the particulars of
no-reliance clauses so that courts and commentators can more clearly see what is at stake in
choices about the enforceability of such clauses.
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decisions on a faulty premise. Contrary to this premise, both buyers and
sellers in arms-length contracts regularly have legitimate and compelling
reasons to include no-reliance clauses in their contracts and to want
courts to enforce these clauses without restrictions." Once the core
assumption made by the majority of courts reluctant to enforce these
clauses has been dispelled, I argue that at least the generic formulations
of a moral prohibition against fraud are insufficient to counterbalance
the value2 gained by autonomous parties choosing what they rationally
believe to be in their own self-interest. Thus, courts should either
enforce no-reliance clauses without restrictions or carefully articulate a
more robust moral basis for a public policy prohibition against them.
. My argument proceeds in three parts. Part II catalogues the current
state of the law with respect to no-reliance clauses. This Part identifies
three basic categories of approaches that courts take. First, some courts
(in Category I) simply refuse to enforce no-reliance clauses. Second,
some courts (in Category II) will enforce such clauses only subject to
one or more substantial limitations. Finally, a growing number of courts
(in Category III) are willing to enforce no-reliance clauses, at least
between sophisticated parties. Part II concludes that a significant
number of cases fall into Categories I or II. In other words, many courts
either prohibit or place significant restrictions on the enforcement of no-
reliance clauses.
Part III argues that the general reluctance of most courts to enforce
no-reliance clauses rests on one of two highly simplified and often
merely implied approaches to the morality of lying, one deontological
and the other consequentialist. Part III concludes, however, that with
the exception of only a rare, die-hard brand of Kantianism, neither
deontological nor consequentialist rationales for opposing lying are
categorical. Both deontologists and consequentialists recognize that
prohibitions against lying can and often do give way to other moral
imperatives or primary principles. Accordingly, even presuming that
sound moral arguments exist in favor of requiring sellers to make honest
27. See infra Part IV.
28. As I explain in Part III in more detail, I am not attempting to make a
commensurabilist claim about the value of no-reliance clauses compared to the value of
prohibitions against fraud. Instead, I assume that the values at play are incommensurable,
but only in a weak sense. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to
Professor Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 815-17 (1993) (describing the difference between
"strong" and "weak" incommensurability). In other words, I contend that even though the
values of no-reliance clauses and prohibitions against fraud are not commensurable, when
they are in conflict, a rational choice between the two can be-and must be-made.
2009]
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representations, courts, faced with autonomous parties that have
voluntarily included no-reliance clauses in their contracts, should
compare the value embodied in that contract-design choice with the
value protected by moral arguments against lying. Courts have avoided
making this comparison, I contend, by presuming that the contract
design side of the balance has no weight. As a result of essentially
"rigging the game," courts have not only ignored legitimate justifications
that might prompt rational buyers and sellers to include no-reliance
clauses in their contracts, but also systematically under-articulated the
supposed moral basis of their reluctance to enforce such clauses.
Part IV takes seriously the notion, denied by the majority
assumption regarding no-reliance clauses, that parties are generally
acting in what they believe to be their own best interest.29 If parties are
acting in their own interest, then some consideration of the value that
parties who include no-reliance clauses in their contracts must be
attaching to them is due. Part V engages in such a consideration. It
concludes that there are at least four legitimate and compelling reasons
why parties might want no-reliance clauses and at least three reasons
why parties would be willing to acquiesce to such clauses.
II. KNOWING LIES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
LAW WITH RESPECT TO NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES
When my love swears that she is made of truth, I do
believe her, though I know she lies."
Commercial transactions rarely, if ever, follow the neat chronology
of classic contract law.3" Instead, such transactions are dynamic. Rather
29. In Judge Richard Posner's words, "man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his
satisfactions-what we shall call his 'self-interest."' RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (2d ed. 1977).
30. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet 138, in SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS 278 (A.L.
Rowse ed., 3d ed. 1984).
31. The classical conception of contract law (often referred to as "formalism") strove for
scientific precision in the deduction and application of acontextual rules. See Larry A.
DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV.
397, 416-17 (2004) (citing CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi, vii (1871)). Variously associated with Samuel Williston,
Christopher Langdell, and Joseph Beale, among others, the classical model of contract was
"[a]bstract conceptualism or formalism." Id. at 416. Melvin Eisenberg has described the
classical model of contract as "axiomatic and deductive. It was objective and standardized. It
was static. It was implicitly based on a paradigm of bargains made between strangers
transacting on a perfect market. It was based on a rational-actor model of psychology."
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than be punctuated by distinct offers and acceptances, contractual
expectations develop over time through the repeated and varied
exchanges and negotiations of parties.3 2  This is particularly true in
complex transactions where numerous agents of buyers and sellers are
engaged in multiple discussions of various facets of the deal.
The need for extensive precontractual negotiations stems, in large
part, from the fact that parties lack knowledge about one another.33
Buyers know little about the characteristics and qualities of sellers and
their promised performances, including sellers' propensities to act
opportunistically.3 4 This sort of uncertainty,35 of course, is pervasive in
all contractual negotiations, but it becomes exacerbated in complex
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805,
805 (2000). Lawrence Friedman has described the classical model of contract this way:
[T]he "pure" law of contract is an area of what we can call abstract
relationships. "Pure" contract doctrine is blind to details of subject matter
and person. It does not ask who buys and who sells, and what is bought
and sold.... Contract law is abstraction-what is left in the law relating
to agreements when all particularities of person and subject-matter are
removed.... The abstraction of classical contract law is not unrealistic; it
is a deliberate renunciation of the particular, a deliberate relinquishment
of the temptation to restrict untrammeled individual autonomy or the
completely free market in the name of social policy.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE
STUDY 20 (1965).
32. See, e.g., Eisenberg supra note 31, at 810 ("Promissory transactions seldom occur in
an instant .... [C]ontract law, if it is to effectuate the objectives of parties to promissory
transactions, must reflect the reality of contracting by adopting dynamic rules that parallel
that reality, rather than static rules that deny that reality.").
33. For the sake of simplicity, I will presume from this point forward that
representations are being made by a seller to a buyer. A buyer, however, may also make
representations to the seller on which the seller might rely. Thus, the roles of the parties
could be reversed in any given case without changing the substance of the remainder of this
Part of the Article.
34. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47-49 (1985). Trade will be worthwhile if it will
produce a joint welfare surplus for the parties. In other words, trade will be worthwhile if it
will be a "win/win situation for both parties (assuming that the promises are rational,
voluntary and informed). If the welfare gains that both parties anticipate are greater than the
expected costs, including the predicted costs of regret, then both parties will be better
off .... Scott, supra note 17, at 282-83.
35. From a purely economic perspective, "uncertainty" in contracts may be said to exist
when the probability or value of alternative outcomes under the contract cannot be
measured. Uncertainty exists, in other words, when "there is no scientific basis on which to
form any calculable probability whatever." John M. Keynes, The General Theory of
Employment, 51 Q.J. ECON. 209, 214 (1937). Uncertainty can then be distinguished from risk,
which involves contingent outcomes of known probability. See id.
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deals. Parties do not know what the probability of reaching an
agreement is, or even how much time and money they should expend to
find out.36 As Professors Hermalin, Katz, and Craswell explain, "[i]n
order to conduct exchange, the parties not only must find each other,
but they must also determine whether trade is worthwhile."37
Parties gain this knowledge during the course of precontractual
exchanges and negotiations. They make representations in order to
learn more about one another and the quality and likelihood of their
respective performances. Such representations might be made at a sales
pitch or over dinner after a hard day of negotiating. They might be
made orally, or they might be made in writing. Whatever their nature
and formality, parties may rely to some degree on these representations
in deciding whether to consummate the deal.
The problem is that not every representation made by a party during
negotiations should be relied on.38 Sellers often puff their products or
36. During this initial period of uncertainty before a contract is formed, each party must
decide when and whether to make investments of various kinds. If a contract is never
consummated, precontractual investments may be forever lost. In these circumstances,
parties sometimes seek to be compensated for investments that they made in reliance on
representations made by their counterparty. Familiar cases like Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965), reflect a liberal approach to the award of such
compensation. Id. at 274-75; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 222
(1987) ("In recent decades, courts have shown increasing willingness to impose
precontractual liability."); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of
Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 496
(1983) ("[I]t is clear that promissory estoppel has been used to enforce promises too
indefinite or incomplete to constitute valid offers."). For an excellent treatment of Red Owl
and the issue of precontractual reliance, see Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and
the Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007); see also, e.g., Richard
Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 495, 504-05 (1996);
Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 694
(1984); Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the
Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 496-99 (1999); Avery Katz, When Should an
Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE
L.J. 1249, 1255-56 (1996); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 673, 686-90 (1969); Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance,
Contracts and Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 717-20. The enforceability of no-reliance clauses
involves similar but not identical concerns.
37. Richard Craswell, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Avery W. Katz, Cojtract Law, in
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 53, 59 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007).
38. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brennan, No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-0562, 2005 WL 1837961, at *8
(N.D. Tex. July 29, 2005) (recognizing that many statements made during the negotiation of a
business transaction are intended to be "merely informational, and ... not meant by either
party to supplant the sophisticated purchaser's own research as the ultimate basis for his
purchasing decision").
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services. 9 And both parties sometimes over-optimistically predict their
capacity or willingness to perform. Perhaps more significantly, however,
during the imbricating exchanges that characterize complex
transactions, parties or any one of their agents working on a deal may
make assertions that appear to mean one thing in one context and seem
to mean something quite different in a later context.40  One party may
hear one thing at the time an assertion is made but recall hearing
another thing at a later date. To complicate matters further, in some
complex transactions, a seller's product or service may function
differently in the context of a buyer's particular objectives. Thus, sellers
may not completely understand their own products or services, at least
39. One marketing text defines "puffery" in the following manner:
[P]uffery: advertising copy that indulges in subjective exaggeration in its
descriptions of a product or service, such as "an outstanding piece of
luggage." Puffery is always a matter of opinion on the part of the
advertiser and often will use words such as "the best" or "the greatest" in
describing the good qualities of a product or service. Sometimes puffery is
extended into an exaggeration that is obviously untrue and becomes an
outright parody, such as, "This perfume will bring out the beast in every
man!"
JANE IMBER & BETSY-ANN TOFFLER, DICTIONARY OF MARKETING TERMS 458 (2000); see
also, e.g., Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 2004)
("Puffery and statements of fact are mutually exclusive. If a statement is a specific,
measurable claim or can be reasonably interpreted as being a factual claim, i.e., one capable
of verification, the statement is one of fact. Conversely, if the statement is not specific and
measurable, and cannot be reasonably interpreted as providing a benchmark by which the
veracity of the statement can be ascertained, the statement constitutes puffery.").
Of course, distinguishing between puffery and factual representations is anything but a
science. See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1403-
04 (2006) ("Because neither courts nor regulators consider empirical evidence about which
claims imply facts, their application of a nominally coherent doctrine creates a host of
decisions in which relatively similar language receives different levels of protection."); id. at
1403 & n.43 (stating that while "authorities assume it is possible to distinguish factual from
nonfactual speech by looking at the speech itself[,]" researchers argue "it is not easy to
distinguish speech conveying factual claims from speech that does not, and that much of the
speech that the FTC refers to as puffery in fact implies facts, which themselves might be false"
(emphasis omitted)). In light of this difficulty, Professor Hoffman recommends presumptive,
though not strict, liability for false statements in the absence of better knowledge about how
puffery affects listeners, as well as evidence of speakers' intent to manipulate consumer
responses. See id. at 1444.
40. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in
Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 326 (2004) (recognizing that language means
different things in different contexts); 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 542 (1960) ("[S]ome of the surrounding circumstances always must be known before the
meaning of the words can be plain and clear; and proof of the circumstances may make a
meaning plain and clear when in the absence of such proof some other meaning may also
have seemed plain and clear." (footnote omitted)).
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in the context of the deal presented, and without a high degree of
information exchange, they may make inadvertent but material
misstatements about the quality or character of their goods or services.
Complex transactions, in short, involve mistakes, exaggerations, and
miscommunications.'
In the face of potential confusion and strife, parties employ various
contractual devices designed to delineate the precise scope and content
of their promissory representations. One virtually ubiquitous device is
the merger or integration clause,42 which invokes the parol evidence rule
to bar proof of representations made prior to, or contemporaneous with,
a completely integrated contract that would contradict or supplement
the contract.43 Merger clauses, however, protect only contracts." Thus,
if a buyer alleges that she was fraudulently induced 5 to enter into the
41. See, e.g., One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 668 F. Supp. 693, 698 (D.D.C. 1987)
(describing how, "[aifter eight months of vigorous negotiations, the parties reached a final
agreement that was lengthy, detailed and comprehensive. During these eight months many
offers, promises and representations were made and several preliminary agreements were
drafted. To avoid a misunderstanding and to make clear that the only understanding between
the parties was that expressed in the Agreement, the parties agreed that the Agreement
'supersede[d] any and all previous understandings and agreements."' (emphasis omitted)).
42. An integration or merger clause is a provision in a contract that recites that the
written terms cannot be "varied by prior or oral agreements because all such agreements have
been [integrated or] merged into the written document." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 892
(5th ed. 1979). Standard merger clauses look something like the following: "'This writing
contains the entire agreement of the parties and there are no promises, understandings, or
agreements of any kind pertaining to this contract other than stated herein."' E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.6a (1990) (footnote omitted).
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 215, 216(1) (1981); UCC § 2-
202 (2005).
44. See, e.g., Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644 (7th
Cir. 2002) ("Doctrine aside, all an integration clause does is limit the evidence available to the
parties should a dispute arise over the meaning of the contract. It has nothing to do with
whether the contract was induced ... by fraud.").
45. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes three general categories of
misrepresentation: fraudulent, negligent, and innocent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 525-49 (fraudulent); 552 (negligent); 552C (innocent) (1977). Fraudulent
misrepresentation, sometimes referred to as deceit, requires: (1) a misrepresentation of (2) a
material fact (3) that the defendant knew or should have known was false (4) made by the
defendant to the plaintiff with the intent to induce plaintiff's reliance. Additionally, (5) the
plaintiff must actually and justifiably rely on the misrepresentation (6) to her detriment. See
id. §§ 525-49.
If a contract was induced by fraud, the promisee may affirm the contract and sue for
breach or void the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164. If the
promisee voids the contract, she can recover damages in tort for the promisor's intentional
misrepresentations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549. This section provides:
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contract by a seller's misrepresentations, and the validity of the contract
is therefore called into question, the buyer is permitted to adduce
evidence of the allegedly fraudulent representations, even if those
representations would otherwise be barred by the parol evidence rule. 6
One consequence of the [rule that integration clauses do
not bar claims sounding in tort] is that parties to
(1) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to recover
as damages in an action of deceit against the maker the pecuniary loss to
him of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause, including
(a) the difference between the value of what he has received in the
transaction and its purchase price or other value given for it; and
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the
recipient's reliance upon the misrepresentation.
(2) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business
transaction is also entitled to recover additional damages sufficient to give
him the benefit of his contract with the maker, if these damages are
proved with reasonable certainty.
Id.
46. See, e.g., Betz Labs., Inc. v. Hines, 647 F.2d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[E]vidence of
fraud in the inducement is outside the parol evidence rule and, consequently, admissible.");
Aplications Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing
several cases to this effect); Withers v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 567 So. 2d 253, 255 (Ala.
1990) ("It is true that fraud can be an exception to the parol evidence rule." (citations
omitted)); Formento v. Encanto Bus. Park, 744 P.2d 22, 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (stating as a
"well-settled" rule that "a party 'can not free himself from fraud by incorporating [an
integration clause] in a contract"' (quoting Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 332 P.2d 493, 495 (Ariz.
1958))); Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 73 (Colo. 1991) (en banc)
(finding that the parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive contract law and does not apply to
tort actions); Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal "Z" Ena, Inc., 598 A.2d 1234, 1235-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991) ("Introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove fraud in the inducement, however, is
a well recognized exception to the parol evidence rule."); Wilburn v. Stewart, 794 P.2d 1197,
1199 (N.M. 1990) ("[P]arol evidence is admissible to show any misrepresentations that
induced the parties to contract."); Gilliland v. Elmwood Props., 391 S.E.2d 577, 580-81 (S.C.
1990) ("The parol evidence rule has been held inapplicable to tort causes of action (including
negligent misrepresentation) since the rule is one of substantive contract law."); MacFarlane
v. Manly, 264 S.E.2d 838, 840 (S.C. 1980) ("The 'as is' clause of the contract does not
constitute an absolute defense to an action for fraud and deceit."); Allen-Parker Co. v. Lollis,
185 S.E.2d 739, 742 (S.C. 1971) (stating that if the contract was formed "with a fraudulent
intent of the party claiming under it, then parol evidence is competent to prove the facts
which constitute the fraud"); Stamp v. Honest Abe Log Homes, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 455, 457
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) ("The general rule is that parol evidence is not admissible to
contradict, alter, or vary the terms of a written instrument, except upon grounds of estoppel,
fraud, accident or mistake." (citations omitted)). But see, e.g., One-O-One Enters., Inc. v.
Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Were we to permit plaintiffs' use of the
defendants' prior representations . . . to defeat the clear words and purpose of the Final
Agreement's integration clause, 'contracts would not be worth the paper on which they are
written."' (quoting Tonn v. Philco Corp., 241 A.2d 442, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1968))).
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contracts who do want to head off the possibility of a
fraud suit will sometimes insert a "no-reliance" clause
into their contract, stating that neither party has relied on
any representations made by the other.
Such clauses may provide that "[n]either party has made any
representation with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement to
induce its execution except as specifically set forth herein, 4 8 or they
may provide that "'none of [the parties] is relying upon any statement or
representation of any agent of the parties being released hereby. Each
of [the parties] is relying on his or her own judgment."'4 9 Whatever their
particular form, no-reliance clauses have the same goal: limit or
eliminate tort liability for potential misstatements made during
precontractual negotiations." As Judge Posner puts it:
47. Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2002).
48. Becker v. Allcom, Inc., No. C04-0958L, 2005 WL 1654524, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July
12, 2005); see also, e.g., Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. 1959)
("The Seller has not made and does not make any representations as to the physical
condition, rents, leases, expenses, operation or any other matter or thing affecting or related
to the aforesaid premises, except as herein specifically set forth, and the Purchaser hereby
expressly acknowledges that no such representations have been made ... ." (emphasis and
quotation omitted)). In this form, such clauses are sometimes referred to as no-
representation clauses. See, e.g., Karen B. Satterleee & Kerry L. Bundy, "You Made Me Do
It": Reliance in Franchise Fraud Cases, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 191, 193 (2007) (referring to a
clause stating that no representations other than or inconsistent with the matters set forth in
the contract were made as a "no representation" clause).
49. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 180 (Tex. 1997) (quoting
from contract); see also, e.g., Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The
parties further declare that they have not relied upon any representation of any party hereby
released [Defendant] or of their attorneys .... agents, or other representatives concerning
the nature or extent of their respective injuries or damages.... [T]his Agreement is executed
by [Plaintiff] freely and voluntarily, and without reliance upon any statement or
representation by Purchaser, the Company, any of the Affiliates or [Defendant] or any of
their attorneys or agents except as set forth herein." (quoting from contract)). In this
formulation, it is easier to understand why such clauses are frequently referred to as "no-
reliance clauses."
50. This Article does not address the potential application of the economic loss doctrine
to bar fraudulent inducement claims. Essentially, the economic loss doctrine is a judicially
created rule that bars recovery in tort for strictly economic losses arising from a contractual
relationship. See, e.g., Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 670-81 (3d Cir. 2002)
(interpreting Pennsylvania law); Palmetto Linen Serv., Inc. v. U.N.X., Inc., 205 F.3d 126, 128-
30 (4th Cir. 2000) (interpreting South Carolina law); Cyberco Holdings, Inc. v. Am. Express
Travel Related Servs. Corp., No. 01 Civ. 2426(DC), 2002 WL 31324028, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 16, 2002) (interpreting Michigan law); Orlando v. Novurania of Am., Inc., 162 F. Supp.
2d 220, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (interpreting New York law); Eye Care Int'l, Inc. v.
Underhill, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314-15 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (interpreting Florida law); Grynberg
v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 10-11 (Utah 2003) (interpreting Wyoming law).
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[A] suit for fraud can be a device for trying to get around
the limitations that the parol evidence rule and contract
integration clauses place on efforts to vary a written
contract on the basis of oral statements made in the
negotiation phase. . . . No-reliance clauses serve a
legitimate purpose in closing a loophole in contract law
(thus resisting, in Judge Kozinski's colorful expression,
the metastasizing of contract law into tort law).51
Courts faced with no-reliance clauses, however, have not responded
uniformly.52 In fact, a survey of cases reveals that the decisions fall into
three basic categories.53 First, a number of courts (in Category I) simply
refuse to enforce such clauses. Second, others (in Category II) may
enforce the clauses, but only subject to significant restrictions. For
instance, some courts will enforce no-reliance clauses only if the seller
can establish that the clauses were specifically negotiated-in other
words, that the clauses are not boilerplate.54 Similarly, some courts will
enforce only no-reliance clauses that are formalistically distinct from
general merger clauses. Other courts may enforce such clauses only if
Because of the sheer volume of litigation involving not only allegations of intentional
fraud but also negligent and innocent misrepresentations, personal injuries, and property
injuries arising from contractual relationships, the economic loss doctrine has a great deal of
practical significance, making it a continuing topic of interest to lawyers, businesses, and
judges. See, e.g., Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate
Commercial Torts, 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (1995) ("[lIt is clear that judges, lawyers, and
commercial clients alike are all desperately struggling to define the parameters of the
economic loss doctrine."). Despite this interest, however, the doctrine remains notoriously
amorphous. See, e.g., Eddward P. Ballinger, Jr. & Samuel A. Thumma, The History,
Evolution and Implications of Arizona's Economic Loss Rule, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491, 491
(2002) ("The intersection between contract and tort law has confounded courts and counsel
for decades."); R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the
Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1789, 1789 (2000) ("The economic loss rule is one of the most confusing doctrines in tort
law."). Notwithstanding the doctrine's importance, however, this Article avoids any detailed
examination of the doctrine because most courts find that "fraud is an intentional tort, and as
such, the intentional misrepresentation is actionable as a tort, notwithstanding that the
contract losses are solely economic." Ralph C. Anzivino, The Fraud in the Inducement
Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 921,922 (2007).
51. Extra Equipamentos e Exportaqdo, Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted).
52. E.g., Steven M. Haas, Contracting Around Fraud Under Delaware Law, 10 DEL. L.
REV. 49, 51 (2008) ("Other jurisdictions have split on the treatment of extra-contractual
disclaimers.").
53. See infra Part II.A-C.
54. See, e.g., Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598-99 (N.Y. 1959).
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the seller can establish that they address with particularity the very type
of factual representation on which the buyer claims to be relying.5 Still
other courts will allow the no-reliance clause to be considered by the
trier of fact only as evidence of the reasonableness of the buyer's
reliance in the particular circumstances of the case. 6 Finally, a growing
number of courts (in Category III) seem to be enforcing no-reliance
clauses to bar claims of fraudulent inducement as a matter of law. 7
A. Category I: Courts Categorically Refusing to Enforce No-Reliance
Clauses
Traditionally, courts refused to enforce no-reliance clauses. 8 As the
New York Court of Appeals explained at the turn of the twentieth
century in Bridger v. Goldsmith:
[T]here is no authority that we are required to follow in
support of the proposition that a party who has
perpetrated a fraud upon his neighbor may nevertheless
contract with him, in. the very instrument by means of
which it was perpetrated, for immunity against its
consequences, close his mouth from complaining of it,
and bind him never to seek redress. Public policy and
morality are both ignored if such an agreement can be
given effect in a court of justice. The maxim that fraud
vitiates every transaction would no longer be the rule,
but the exception. It could be applied then only in such
case as the guilty party neglected to protect himself from
his fraud by means of such a stipulation. Such a principle
55. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 310, 316-18 (2d Cir. 1993)
("[W]here specificity has been lacking, dismissal of [a] fraud claim has been ruled
inappropriate[, and] ... [w]here [a] fraud claim has been dismissed, the disclaimer has been
sufficiently specific to match the alleged fraud.").
56. See, e.g., Nutrasep, LLC v. TOPC Tex. LLC, No. A-05-CA-523 LY, 2006 WL
3063432, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006) (noting that the specificity of a no-reliance clause's
language may shed light on a jury's consideration of the defendant's claims of reliance).
57. See cases discussed infra Part I.C.
58. "Should a person escape liability for his own fraudulent statements by inserting in a
contract a clause to the effect that the other party shall not rely upon them? Most courts
throughout this country and in England have replied to this question in the negative."
Richard T. Rosen, Comment, Disclaimer of Liability for Fraud in Written Agreements, 24
ALB. L. REV. 148, 148 (1960) (footnote omitted); see also Recent Decision, Contracts-
Stipulation Against Effect of Fraud, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231 (1925) ("[N]o agreement of
the parties can preclude the defense of fraud.").
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would in a short time break down every barrier which the
law has erected against fraudulent dealing.5 9
An early Minnesota Supreme Court case, Ganley Bros. v. Butler Bros.
Building Co.,' serves as a prime example of this jurisprudential
approach to no-reliance clauses. In Ganley, a defendant general
contractor engaged the services of the plaintiff subcontractor for the
construction of roads. 6' The plaintiff alleged that it was induced into the
contracts by the defendant's fraud. 6' The defendant countered by
pointing to a no-reliance provision in the contract that, even by the most
exacting standards, would seem to disclaim responsibility for
precontractual misrepresentations by the defendant:
The contractor has examined the said contracts of
December 7, 1922, and the specifications and plans
forming a part thereof, and is familiar with the location
of said work and the conditions under which the same
must be performed, and knows all the requirements, and
is not relying upon any statement made by the company
in respect thereto. The contractor further represents that
it is familiar with the kind and character of the work to
be done, as called for by said plans, specifications, and
contract, and that it is experienced in road building.
63
In the defendant's view, this disclaimer should have been enforced
because "a party should have the legal right to let his work to a certain
person because the other will therein agree that he relies and acts only
upon his own knowledge and not upon the representations of his
adversary." 6' Although the court agreed, in theory, with this freedom-
of-contract notion-a contracting party, the court conceded, "should
have this right" 65-it could come up with no legitimate reason why the
right would ever need to be invoked. 6 Without a legitimate justification
59. 38 N.E. 458, 459 (N.Y. 1894).
60. 212 N.W. 602 (Minn. 1927).
61. Id. at 602.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 603.
65. Id.
66. See id. The court did note that it might "be desirable in dealing with unscrupulous
persons to have [a no-reliance] clause as a shield against wrongful charges of fraud." Id. But
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for the no-reliance clause, the court concluded that "[t]he law should
not, and does not, permit a covenant of immunity to be drawn that will
protect a person against his own fraud.... Fraud destroys all consent."67
In the same year that the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Ganley,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision invoking a
strikingly similar line of reasoning in Arnold v. National Aniline &
Chemical Co.68 Although the court in Arnold ultimately concluded that
the clause at issue did not "purport to exclude causes of action for
fraud"69 and thus could not suffice to disclaim fraud in the inducement,
it discussed the enforceability of no-reliance clauses at some length.7°
This discussion reveals a fervent skepticism of such clauses, even though
it also suggests, as did the discussion in Ganley, that a few courts, at the
time, were exploring the possibility of enforcing these clauses in the
name of freedom of contract.7 Notwithstanding the general strength of
freedom-of-contract principles, however, according to the Second
Circuit, the decisions refusing to enforce no-reliance clauses were
superior because they were "based upon a greater consideration for the
individual who may suffer wrong through deliberate fraud."72
The traditional and categorical approach to the enforceability of no-
reliance clauses embodied in cases like Bridger, Ganley, and Arnold still
captures the attention of some modern courts. For instance, according
to the California Court of Appeals,
[a] party to a contract who has been guilty of fraud in its
inducement cannot absolve himself [or herself] from the
effects of his [or her] fraud by any stipulation in the
contract, either that no representations have been made,
in the court's view, "if there is no fraud that fact will be established on the trial," and "every
party should have his day in court." Id.
67. Id.
68. 20 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1927).
69. Id. at 369.
70. Id. at 368-69.
71. Id. at 369 (citing several Massachusetts cases for the proposition that "where one
declares in his contract that every representation to which he will undertake to hold the
opposite party is embodied in the agreement, no fraud which does not enter into the
execution [as opposed to inducement] of the contract can avail either as a defense or as
ground for an independent action").
72. Id.
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or that any right which might be grounded upon them is
waived."
Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court has declared that "Tennessee
law 'gives no effect to disclaimers in the presence of fraud, ' ' 7 4 and the
Utah Supreme Court has held that "'[t]he law does not permit a
covenant of immunity which will protect a person against his own fraud
on the ground of public policy."' 75
73. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d
783, 788 n.7 (1995) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Simmons v. Ratterree Land Co., 17 P.2d
727, 728 (Cal. 1932) ("A seller cannot escape liability for his own fraud or false
representations by the insertion of provisions such as are embodied in the contract of sale
herein.").
74. First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Brooks Farms, 821 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tenn. 1991)
(quoting Agristor Leasing v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods. Inc., 869 F.2d 264, 268 (6th Cir.
1989)); see also In re Sikes, 184 B.R. 742, 746 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995) ("Tennessee... does
not permit disclaimers of liability or exculpatory clauses to excuse a party from fraud.");
Robinson v. Tate, 236 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950) ("We think citation of authority
is unnecessary for the statement that one may not contract against liability for fraud.").
75. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993) (quoting
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974)). Other states follow suit. See, e.g., Nw.
Bank and Trust Co. v. First Ill. Nat'l Bank, 354 F.3d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Under Iowa
law, contractual disclaimers are ineffective to bar a plaintiff from asserting a claim for
fraudulent inducement." (citing Hall v. Crow, 34 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Iowa 1948) ("[W]here
there is evidence of fraudulent misrepresentations in the inception of a contract such
misrepresentations can be the basis for either an action to rescind or for damages, despite the
limiting provisions of a contract."))); Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1994)
("We could not uphold any provision intended to insulate parties from their own fraud. It is
well settled that parties cannot use contractual limitation of liability clauses to shield
themselves from liability for their own fraudulent conduct."); RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v.
First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee, 636 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (E.D. Wis. 1986) ("There is
ample Wisconsin caselaw in which [courts have held] disclaimers of liability ineffective
against claims of fraudulent misrepresentation." (citing Malas v. Lounsbury, 214 N.W. 332,
333 (Wis. 1927) ("An express agreement made in a contract that it shall be incontestable for
fraud is void as against public policy."))); Oak Indus., Inc. v. Foxboro Co., 596 F. Supp. 601,
607 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (recognizing that under California law the general rule is that,
notwithstanding no-representation clauses, extrinsic evidence of fraud may be used to prove
fraud in the inducement); Sperau v. Ford Motor Co., 674 So. 2d 24, 35-36 (Ala. 1995), vacated
and remanded, 517 U.S. 1217 (1996), ajfd subject to remittitur of punitive damages 708 So. 2d
111, 124 (1997) (allowing plaintiffs to prove that defendants had misrepresented the
profitability of a franchise notwithstanding a written contractual provision that no
representations had been made regarding profitability, because "'[t]o refuse relief [on
grounds of the disclaimer] would result in a multitude of frauds and in thwarting the general
policy of the law' (citation omitted)); Reece v. Finch, 562 So. 2d 195, 200 (Ala. 1990)
(holding that "releases as to future intentional [torts are] prohibited"); Burton v. Linotype
Co., 556 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("'Fraud is an intentional tort and thus
not subject to the cathartic effect of the exculpatory clauses found in contracts."' (quoting L.
Luria & Son, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 460 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)));
Robinson v. Perpetual Servs. Corp,, 412 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Iowa 1987) (reaffirming the
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Even the Restatement (Second) of Contracts declares that "[a] term
unreasonably exempting a party from the legal consequences of a
misrepresentation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. '7 6 So, as
Illustration 1 says, if "A and B sign a written agreement containing a
term precluding B from asserting any misrepresentations made by A[,]
[t]he term is unenforceable on grounds of public policy with respect to
both fraudulent and non-fraudulent misrepresentations.", 77 Despite the
crisp clarity of the illustration example, however, on its face the
Restatement's use of the qualifier "unreasonably" seems to raise at least
the possibility that a no-reliance clause could be enforced in some
limited-not unreasonable--circumstances. 7 As the next section
principle laid down in Hall); Miles Excavating, Inc. v. Rutledge Backhoe & Septic Tank
Servs., Inc., 927 P.2d 517, 518 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) ("We hold that parol evidence is
admissible to show fraud in the inducement of a contract even where the contract contains a
provision stating the parties have not relied on any representations other than those
contained in the writing."); Bryant v. Troutman, 287 S.W.2d 918, 920-21 (Ky. 1956) ("One
cannot contract against his fraud."); McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Norton Co., 563 N.E.2d
188, 194 (Mass. 1990) ("We continue to believe that parties to contracts, whether experienced
in business or not, should deal with each other honestly, and that a party should not be
permitted to engage in fraud to induce the contract."); Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E.2d 551, 555
(Mass. 1941) (noting in a fraud case involving a contract providing that defendant made no
representations that "[a]ttempts under the form of contract to secure total or partial
immunity from liability for fraud are all under the ban of the law" (citation and quotation
omitted)); Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage., Inc., 518 N.W.2d 910, 919 (Neb. 1994) ("Citicorp
cannot escape liability for the fraudulent conduct of its agent on the sole basis that it included
a disclaimer clause in the purchase agreement."); Niehaus v. Haven Park West, Inc., 440
N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) ("'Fraud which enters into the actual making of a
contract cannot be excluded from the reach of the law by any formal phrase inserted in the
contract itself."' (citation omitted)); Carty v. McMenamin, 216 P. 228, 230-31 (Or. 1923)
(noting in a case involving a contractual provision stating that defendants made no
representation about the subject of the fraud that "[i]f a party is guilty of fraud in making a
contract, he cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his own wrong by a provision
in writing that his fraudulent oral representations shall not be used as evidence against him in
a case in which fraud and deceit is the gist of the cause"); Dieterich v. Rice, 197 P. 1, 3 (Wash.
1921) (stating that a contractual provision wherein plaintiff represented that he had not relied
on any sayings or inducements by defendant was worth no more than a piece of waste paper
in a fraud case); Baylies v. Vanden Boom, 278 P. 551, 553-54, 557 (Wyo. 1929) (giving no
efficacy to a contractual provision stating that plaintiff relied on no statements by defendant
not contained in the writing).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 196 (1981). Comment a goes on to
specifically contemplate the use of no-reliance clauses that effectively "prevent[] reliance by
the recipient on a misrepresentation (see § 167) or that make[] reliance unjustified (see
§ 172)." Id. cmt. a.
77. Id. cmt. a, illus. 1.
78. Some courts citing section 196 seem to find that all purported disclaimers of
intentional fraud are per se "unreasonable." See, e.g., Merzin v. Provident Fin. Group, Inc.,
311 F. Supp. 2d 674, 685 (S.D. Ohio 2004) ("[I]t seems inequitable to permit a party to
eliminate liability for an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by drafting such a term.");
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discusses, some courts agree and may enforce no-reliance clauses, but
only subject to significant restrictions.
B. Category II: Courts Enforcing No-Reliance Clauses, but Only Subject
to Significant Limitations
Although, as the Second Circuit noted in Arnold v. National Aniline
and Chemical Co., some courts before the middle of the twentieth
century occasionally enforced or considered enforcing no-reliance
clauses,79 it was not until the New York Court of Appeals decided
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris' in 1959 that no-reliance clause
jurisprudence began to change in a demonstrable fashion.8 In Danann,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendants had induced him to buy the
lease of a building by making false oral representations about the
operating expenses of the building and its overall profitability.82 The
written agreement between the parties, however, contained a no-
reliance clause stating that the defendants had not made any
representations "as to the physical condition, rents, leases, expenses,
operation or any other matter or thing affecting or related to the
aforesaid premises."" The agreement went on to provide that "neither
party [was] relying upon any statement or representation, not embodied
in this contract, made by the other."'8 Although the majority noted that
a general and vague merger clause would not bar parol evidence to
support a fraud claim,85 it found that the contract's specific disclaimer of
reliance on the very types of representations that constituted the alleged
fraud prevented the plaintiff from claiming that it had justifiably relied
on any fraudulent pre-contractual misrepresentations. 86
Blankenheim v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 593, 599 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("The
Restatement 2d of Contracts and the modern trend are in accord: there can be no exemption
from liability for any misrepresentation." (emphasis omitted)). Presumably, in the view of
these courts, section 196 allows only reasonable no-reliance-type clauses to exempt parties
from the consequences of unintentional misrepresentations.
79. 20 F.2d 364, 369 (2d. Cir. 1927).
80. 157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959).
81. See id. at 602 (Fuld, J., dissenting) (asserting that, prior to the majority's decision, "it
matter[ed] not" whether the no-reliance clause was general, specific, or even precise to the
fraudulent allegations because they were not enforceable).
82. Id. at 598.
83. Id. (emphasis omitted).
84. Id. (emphasis omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 600.
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Following Danann, other courts applying New York law have
allowed enforcement of no-reliance clauses only if the defendant can
show that the clauses were specifically negotiated (nonboilerplate) and
particularly set out the precise representations at issue." For instance,
in Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas,8' the Second Circuit
held that a no-reliance clause was not enforceable because the clause
did "not, in words or substance, contain disclaimers of the
representations that formed the basis of [the plaintiff's] claim of
fraudulent inducement."89  Many of the courts following Danann,
however, have "ratcheted up" the degree of proof required to establish
that a provision is not boilerplate and have tightened the required
degree of specificity needed to disclaim representations.'
Similarly, some courts outside of New York, following the basic
precepts of Danann, have imposed even more stringent limitations on
the enforceability of no-reliance clauses. Two recent cases applying
Texas law, Warehouse Associates Corp. Centre II, Inc. v. Celotex Corp.9"
and Nutrasep, LLC v. TOPC Texas LLC,92 demonstrate just how
stringent these requirements can be.
87. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 575 (2d Cir.
2005) ("The venerable principles established in Danann remain the law of New York State.");
Grumman Allied Indus., Inc. v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 735 (2d. Cir. 1984) ("The
Danann rule operates where the substance of the disclaimer provisions tracks the substance
of the alleged misrepresentations.").
88. 7 F.3d 310, 316-18 (2d Cir. 1993) (reinstating a fraud claim and holding that no-
reliance clauses can only be upheld if they are specifically negotiated, nonboilerplate,
provisions that address, with particularity, the representations at issue).
89. Id. at 318.
90. See, e.g., Zaro Bake Shop, Inc. v. David, 574 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (App. Div. 1991)
(finding that "although the guarantee provided that the [defendants] were 'absolutely and
unconditionally' liable on the note, such language, in and of itself, was ... insufficient to
preclude the [defendants] from introducing proof of fraud in the inducement"); DiFilippo v.
Hidden Ponds Assocs., 537 N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (App. Div. 1989) (stating that a contract
provision was not a bar to fraud-in-inducement claim where it "d[id] not specifically disclaim
reliance on any oral representation concerning the particular matter as to which plaintiff now
claims he was defrauded"); GTE Automatic Electric Inc. v. Martin's Inc., 512 N.Y.S.2d 107,
108 (App. Div. 1987) (finding that a recitation that underlying notes are absolute and
unconditional does not bar proof of fraud in inducement of the guarantee since there was
"not ... a specific disclaimer, as in ... Danann Realty and, therefore, the principle of [that
case] does not apply"); Goodridge v. Fernandez, 505 N.Y.S.2d 144, 147 (App. Div. 1986)
(finding that the defendant was not barred from asserting fraud-in-inducement defense
because, "in sharp contrast to the guarantee in [another case], [the defendant's guarantee]
contains no specific disclaimer of defenses available to the guarantor with [respect] to the
guaranty").
91. 192 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
92. No. A-05-CA-523 LY, 2006 WL 3063432 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006).
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Celotex arose out of a dispute over the sale of property. The
defendant seller had "operated an asphalt shingle manufacturing plant
on the Property for a number of years" prior to entering into the
contract to sell it to the plaintiff.93 While negotiating the sale, the
defendant provided the plaintiff with a partial environmental report
indicating that asbestos had been used in the buildings on the property
but omitting information about asbestos contamination in the soil and
the use of asbestos in the shingle manufacturing process.94  The
defendant then discovered asbestos in the soil but did not disclose this
finding to the plaintiff, who conducted an independent environmental
assessment of the soil. 95 After the inspection period and closing, the
plaintiff discovered significant asbestos contamination in the soil and
brought suit against the defendant, alleging fraud and
misrepresentation. 96
The sale contract included an extensive "waiver-of-reliance"
provision providing, for example, that:
Purchaser acknowledges and agrees that seller has not
made, does not make and specifically disclaims any
representations, warranties, promises, covenants,
agreements or guaranties of any kind or character
whatsoever, whether express or implied, oral or written,
past, present or future, of, as to, concerning or with
respect to (A) the nature, quality or condition of the
property, including without limitation, the water, soil and
geology, (B) the income to be derived from the property,
(C) the suitability of the property for any and all
activities and uses which Purchaser may conduct
thereon[.] 7
Considering that this disclaimer seemed to address precisely the very
sort of matter allegedly creating the fraud, the defendant argued that the
plaintiff's fraud claims should be barred by it.98
93. Celotex, 192 S.W.3d at 227.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 228.
96. Id. at 228-29.
97. Id. at 235.
98. Id. at 234-35.
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After reviewing prior Texas precedent,9 the court in Celotex
determined that a carefully negotiated no-reliance clause was not
necessarily enforceable: "an arm's length transaction between parties
represented by counsel is not enough to enforce a waiver-of-reliance
clause."'' Additionally, the court determined that the specificity in the
no-reliance clause was insufficient, even if coupled with the fact that the
clause was carefully negotiated, to make the clause enforceable.' °'
Instead, in the court's estimation, an additional circumstance must be
proven before a no-reliance clause will be enforced to bar fraudulent
inducement claims: the fraud must induce a party to sign a release or
settlement agreement intended to definitively resolve a long-running
dispute between the parties."2
The court in Nutrasep followed essentially the same analysis as the
court in Celotex and reached a very similar result. The dispute in
Nutrasep involved a Technology Licensing Agreement and a
Manufacturing and Supply Agreement.1 3  Nutrasep, LLC (NTS)
purported to have developed a system for improving the quality of
soybean oil, which it licensed to TOPC.'O° TOPC was an agricultural
cooperative that produced soybean oil."°5 NTS sued TOPC for breach of
the Technology License Agreement and the Manufacturing and Supply
Agreement, based on TOPC's failure to make the required payments."
TOPC argued, in response, that NTS had misrepresented the
uniqueness of NTS's technology and the amount of investment that
TOPC would be required to make. 1"7 In a motion for summary
judgment, NTS asserted that these fraud counterclaims should fail as a
matter of law because of a no-reliance clause, providing in pertinent part
that:
99. Primarily, the court focused on a close analysis of Schlumberger Technology Corp. v.
Swanson, a decision that was self-consciously fact-specific. 959 S.W.2d 171, 181 (Tex. 1997)
("We conclude only that on this record, the disclaimer of reliance conclusively negates as a
matter of law the element of reliance on representations... needed to support the [plaintiff's]
claim of fraudulent inducement.").
100. 192 S.W.3d at 233.
101. Id. at 234.
102. Id.
103. Nutrasep, LLC v. TOPC Tex. LLC, No. A-05-CA-523 LY, 2006 WL 3063432, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *2.
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[TOPC], by execution hereof, acknowledges, covenants
and agrees that it has not been induced in any way by
NTS or its employees to enter into this Agreement, and
further warrants and represents that (i) it has conducted
sufficient due diligence with respect to all items and
issues pertaining to this Article 3 and all other matters
pertaining to this Agreement; and (ii) [TOPC] has
adequate knowledge and expertise, or has utilized
knowledgeable and expert consultants, to adequately
conduct the due diligence, and agrees to accept all risks
inherent herein. . . This Agreement constitutes the
entire and only agreement between the parties for
Licensed Subject Matter and all other prior negotiations,
representations, agreements, and understandings are
superseded hereby. No agreements altering or
supplementing the terms hereof may be made except by
a written document signed by both parties.'"
Following the Celotex court's lead, the court in Nutrasep concluded
that these no-reliance provisions were not necessarily dispositive of the
fraud claim.'" First, NTS and TOPC "entered into the Agreements in
order to create a business relationship, not end an existing one [and
resolve a dispute between the parties]."1 ' Second, TOPC was not
represented by counsel, and the provisions were "standard boiler-plate
provisions that do not clearly and unequivocally disclaim reliance on the
specific representations that form the basis for [TOPC's] fraud
claims."".. Accordingly, the court denied NTS's motion for summary
judgment on TOPC's fraud claims."2 The court did note, however, that
"given the language of the various clauses, a jury may well find
[TOPC's] professions of reliance on [NTS's] statements lacking in
credibility." "
3
108. Id. at *6.
109. Id. at *8.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that no-reliance clauses
may only be considered as evidence relevant to determining whether the allegedly defrauded
party reasonably relied on the representation at issue. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Guest Capital,
LLC, 386 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (2005) ("[T]he Court deems it imprudent to examine the non-
reliance clauses in an abstract fashion without delving further into the undisputed facts
regarding [the alleged fraud].").
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.Cases like Celotex and Nutrasep, in short, demonstrate an approach
that has emerged since Danann in which some courts enforce no-
reliance clauses, but only somewhat grudgingly and subject to strict
limitations.' 4 As the next section observes, only a few courts have
pressed beyond the strictures of post-Danann reasoning to find that no-
reliance clauses may be enforced without restrictions.
C. Category III: Courts Enforcing No-Reliance Clauses Without
Significant Limitations
A few courts freely give effect to no-reliance clauses "5 or strongly
suggest that they will do so. "6 At the avant-garde are the Delaware
114. See, e.g., Dunbar Med. Sys., Inc. v. Gammex Inc., 216 F.3d 441, 450-51 (5th Cir.
2000) (applying Texas law to hold that a "sold as is" clause coupled with a clause providing
that no other oral representations had been made did not prevent plaintiff from proving
defendant's fraud); Deluxe Media Servs., LLC v. Direct Disc Network, Inc., No. 06 C 1666,
2007 WL 707544, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2007) (effectively endorsing the specificity
requirement of Yanakas); Becker v. Allcom, Inc., No. C04-0958L, 2005 WL 1654524, at *4
(W.D. Wash. July 12, 2005) ("[T]he fact that an agreement includes a non-reliance provision
is relevant but not dispositive of whether reliance on outside representations was
reasonable."); DynCorp v. GTE Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 308, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Dyncorp's
particularized disclaimers [that extra-contractual representation that were made were not
being relied upon] make it impossible for it to prove one of the elements of a claim of fraud:
that it reasonably relied on the representations that it alleges were made to induce it to enter
into the Purchase Agreement."); In re Hovis, 325 BR. 158, 167 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2005) (finding
that fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims did not fail as a matter of law in the face of
a non-reliance clause, but noting that such clauses could raise a doubt about whether
reasonable reliance existed); Slack v. James, 614 S.E.2d 636, 640-41 (S.C. 2005) (finding that a
clause providing that both parties "acknowledge that they have not received or relied upon
any statements or representations by either Broker or their agents which are not expressly
stipulated herein" was merely a general merger clause and insufficient to preclude a fraud-in-
the-inducement claim (emphasis omitted)); Stewart v. Estate of Steiner, 93 P.3d 919, 927
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing a no-reliance clause to stand but only considering it as a
factor that could be weighed by a trier of fact in determining whether the plaintiff's reliance
was reasonable under the circumstances).
115. Of course, such clauses are always subject to the same restrictions and limitations as
any other contract provisions.
116. See, e.g., MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 2005)
(rejecting New York's particularity rule and upholding a no-reliance clause); Garcia v. Santa
Maria Resort, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that, as a matter of
law, a plaintiff could not maintain a fraud claim against the defendant in the face of an
express no-reliance clause); Eclipse Med., Inc. v. Am. Hydro-Surgical Instruments, Inc., 262
F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("[R]eliance on fraudulent representations is
unreasonable as a matter of law where the alleged misrepresentations contradict the express
terms of the ensuing written agreement."); H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129,
142 n.18 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating in dicta that "[t]he Court of Chancery has consistently held
that sophisticated parties to negotiated commercial contracts may not reasonably rely on
information that they contractually agreed did not form a part of the basis for their decision
to contract" (citation omitted)).
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courts (or courts applying Delaware law). Although the Delaware
Supreme Court technically remains wary of no-reliance clauses,"7 the
clear trend in Delaware is evidenced by the Abry court's bold assertion
about the clarity of Delaware's no-reliance clause jurisprudence:
We have honored clauses in which contracted parties
have disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual
representations, which prohibits the promising party
from reneging on its promise by premising a fraudulent
inducement claim on statements of fact it had previously
said were neither made to it nor had an effect on it."8
A recent case by the Third Circuit applying Delaware law, MBIA
Insurance Corp. v. Royal Indemnity Co.,"' illustrates this trend. In
MBIA, the court upheld the enforceability of a no-reliance clause
despite the fact that the contract (or more precisely a series of insurance
contracts) had been obtained as a result of a "spectacular fraud."'2 °
Because "[t]he Delaware Supreme Court ha[d] not addressed the
standards for effective waiver of a defense based on fraud in the
inducement," the Third Circuit had to predict how the Delaware
Supreme Court would rule on this issue.'2' Although previous Delaware
precedent appeared to indicate that Delaware courts would follow the
New York approach and require that enforceable no-reliance clauses
appear outside of mere boilerplate provisions, 22 the Third Circuit
117. See Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. 1982). In Norton, the plaintiff buyer
sought to rescind a real estate transaction by alleging that the seller had negligently
misrepresented the land's zoning. Id. The purchase agreement contained a no-reliance
clause stating that "Purchasers and Sellers agree that they have read and fully understand this
contract & furthermore they acknowledge that they do not rely on any written or oral
representations not expressly written in this contract." Id. at 3. In response to the seller's
effort to defeat the buyer's claims using this clause, the Delaware Supreme Court declared
that such a clause "does not preclude a claim based upon fraudulent misrepresentations." Id.
at 6.
118. Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1057 (Del. Ch.
2006) (stating in dicta that "a party cannot promise, in a clear integration clause of a
negotiated agreement, that it will not rely on promises and representations outside of the
agreement and then shirk its own bargain in favor of a 'but we did rely on those other
representations' fraudulent inducement claim").
119. 426 F.3d 204.
120. Id. at 208.
121. Id. at 214.
122. See In re Med. Wind Down Holdings III, Inc., 332 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. D. Del.
2005) ("'[B]ecause Delaware's public policy is intolerant of fraud, the intent to preclude
reliance on extra-contractual statements must emerge clearly and unambiguously from the
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effectively eviscerated this requirement. In weighing the degree of
comprehensiveness and detail in no-reliance clauses in the insurance
policies at issue, the court concluded that "[t]he lack of specificity in [the
issuer's] waivers does not make them any less clear." 123 The court went
on to say that:
[g]iven the potential for misrepresentation from each
side of the agreement, the safer route is to leave parties
that can protect themselves to their own devices,
enforcing the agreement they actually fashion. This rule
will make for less prolix disclaimers and reduce the
likelihood that an intended allocation of the risk of fraud
will be frustrated by an unintentional omission from a
long and tedious list of representations. . . . When
sophisticated parties include a broad but unambiguous
anti-reliance clause in their agreement, the Delaware
Supreme Court will likely indulge the assumption that
they said what they meant and meant what they said.124
Cases like MBIA, however, are unusual. Most of the decisions
surveyed either refuse to enforce no-reliance clauses or will enforce such
clauses only subject to a number of limitations or restrictions. As the
next Part argues, courts skeptical of no-reliance clauses seem to rest
their judgments on moral prohibitions against lying. Giving at best
cursory attention to generic notions of freedom of contract, these courts
presume that parties have gained no legitimate value from no-reliance
clauses.
III. "DESIGNS AND ARTIFICES OF THE CRAFTY": THE GENERIC
MORAL THEORIES RELIED ON BY COURTS RELUCTANT TO ENFORCE
NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES
An action for fraud, it has been said, serves to protect "the weak and
the ignorant against the designs and artifices of the crafty." '25 In the
context of precontractual negotiations, fraud may consist of an
contract."' (quoting Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004))); Norton, 443
A.2d at 7 ("We see no reason why a court of equity should enforce a standard 'boiler plate'
provision that would permit one who makes a material misrepresentation to retain the benefit
resulting from that misrepresentation at the expense of an innocent party.").
123. MBIA Ins. Corp., 426 F.3d at 218.
124. Id.
125. Medbury v. Watson, 47 Mass. (6 Met.) 246, 259 (1843).
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intentional misrepresentation about the character or quality of
performance, dissimulation about the likelihood of performance, or
both. Misrepresentations of the first kind lead promisees to enter into
contracts that they otherwise might avoid by convincing them that the
promised performance will be more valuable than it actually is.
Misrepresentations of the second kind, in contrast, lead promisees to
enter into contracts that they might otherwise avoid by convincing them
that the promisor has a greater intent or ability to perform than he
actually does. This second kind of misrepresentation hinges on the
recognition that "the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state
of his digestion."'26 In other words, "[b]y saying something about the
promisor's present intent [to perform], the act of promising creates the
opportunity to lie."'27
Because fraud is a "'protean legal concept, assuming many shapes
and forms,' 128 courts tend to be particularly solicitous of alleged victims
of fraudulent representations. As the previous section demonstrates, in
the context of no-reliance clauses, this solicitude means that a significant
number of courts remain wary of enforcing no-reliance clauses. Some
(Category I courts) simply will not do so under any circumstances.
Others (Category II courts) may enforce the clauses, but only subject to
significant restrictions. Both categories of courts, I contend, rely, often
only implicitly, on one of two generic moral theories to justify their
conclusion that no-reliance clauses should not be enforced or should be
enforced only with significant limitations. Specifically, courts either rely
on deontological conceptions of the value of autonomy and the harm to
autonomy caused by lying 29 or consequentialist conceptions of the harm
126. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (Ch. App. 1885).
127. IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF
MISREPRESENTED INTENT 4 (2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt.
c (1977) ("A representation of the state of mind of the maker or of a third person is a
misrepresentation if the state of mind in question is otherwise than as represented. Thus, a
statement that a particular person, whether the maker of the statement or a third person, is of
a particular opinion or has a particular intention is a misrepresentation if the person in
question does not hold the opinion or have the intention asserted.").
128. Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. 1986) (quoting Jacobs v.
Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 377 N.W.2d 441, 444 n.1 (Minn. 1985)); see also, e.g., Stonemets v.
Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913) ("Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite. Fraud being infinite
and taking on protean form at will, were courts to cramp themselves by defining it with a hard
and fast definition, their jurisdiction would be cunningly circumvented at once by new
schemes beyond the definition.").
129. Lying may be defined more narrowly than fraud, which in some jurisdictions
includes more than intentional misrepresentations. Indeed, a number of courts have devised
various formulations that have "stretched" the concept of scienter, allowing recovery for
2009]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:423
caused to the fabric of society as a whole by lying in contract
negotiations. "3
The following two sections trace, in broad strokes, both arguments.
The goals of these sections are twofold. First, I want to describe,
sympathetically, the powerful, if only generic, concerns regarding fraud
that seem to underlie courts' reluctance to enforce no-reliance clauses.
After all, "[l]egal rules must be constructed and justified in ways that
take into account the fact that law embodies a system of rules and
practices that moral agents inhabit, enforce, and are subject to alongside
other aspects of their lives, especially their moral agency., 131 It will not
do to advance an argument in favor of the enforcement of no-reliance
clauses without accounting for the moral intuition that such clauses
violate fundamental precepts of morality and fairness. Second, I want to
demonstrate that neither deontological nor consequentialist conceptions
of the wrongfulness of lying, with the exception of a rare brand of
Kantianism, constitute categorical norms. Instead, moral prohibitions
against lying are, in the main, prophylactic in nature. Accordingly, as I
argue in the third section of this Part, even presuming that one or both
conceptions have moral purchase, other first-order principles, like
misstatements made with something less than an intent to deceive. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 740-42 (5th ed. 1984); see also, e.g.,
Leon Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749, 752-57 (1930) (discussing various court formulas for
meeting scienter requirements in fraud actions). For example, some courts have imputed
knowledge to the defendant, thereby concluding that the defendant "knew" of the falsity of
her statement. KEETON ET AL., supra, § 107, at 740-42. Other courts have allowed recovery
for misstatements made "recklessly." See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d
Cir. 1979); Flamme v. Wolf Ins. Agency, 476 N.W.2d 802, 809 (Neb. 1991) (Shanahan, J.,
concurring). Finally, most courts find that fraud may include omissions as well as express
representations. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 184-85 (1817) ("Suppression of
material circumstances within the knowledge of the vendee, and not accessible to the vendor,
is equivalent to fraud, and vitiates the contract.").
While there may be moral gradations between the various forms of deception that count
as "fraud," it seems beyond cavil that the most morally reprehensible form of deception is the
outright lie. Accordingly, moral prohibitions against fraud are at their strongest when the
fraud involves a lie. For the purposes of this Article, then, I will limit myself to an
examination of this strongest moral case against fraud.
130. The basic framework tracks a distinction made by Alasdair Maclntyre between
"two rival moral traditions with respect to truth-telling and lying, one for which a lie is
primarily an offense against trust and one for which it is primarily an offense against truth."
Alasdair Maclntyre, Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn from
Mill and Kant?, in 16 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 336 (Grethe B.
Peterson ed., 1995).
131. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708, 712 (2007).
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freedom of contract, can and should take priority in particular
situations.
Importantly, I do not make any strong claims in this section about
whether freedom of contract should trump moral prohibitions against
lying in the context of no-reliance clauses. My goal is more modest. I
simply mean to establish that a comparison of first-order moral
principles is needed. To date, courts have not engaged in this
comparison, relying instead on a faulty presumption that no-reliance
clauses have no morally legitimate value to contracting parties.
A. Deontological Rationales
A lie is the statement, verbal or nonverbal, of a proposition that the
speaker believes to be false, but that the speaker intends the listener to
take as a proposition the speaker believes to be true.132 So defined, lying
is widely condemned as wrong, and as a general matter, it is proscribed
by the law, but opinions differ as to why.133 One of the most pervasive
explanations for the wrongfulness of lying derives from Immanuel Kant.
Kant had no patience for lies. He stated that "the greatest violation
of man's duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being (the
humanity in his own person) is the contrary of truthfulness, lying....
[B]y a lie a man throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a
man." '134 He continued:
A [human being] who does not himself believe what he
tells another ... has even less worth than if he were a
mere thing; for a thing because it is something real and
given, has the property of being serviceable so that
another can put it to some use. But communication of
132. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral
Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 159
(2002) ("Lying, as we shall see, involves asserting what one believes is literally false.").
133. For an excellent discussion of the various legal responses to deception, see
generally Alan Strudler, Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud,
146 U. PENN. L. REV. 1529 (1998). See also Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC,
891 A.2d 1032, 1035 (2006) ("The public policy against fraud is a strong and venerable one
that is largely founded on the societal consensus that lying is wrong.").
134. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 225 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991)
(1797) (emphasis omitted). Augustine similarly regarded lies as wrong in principle. See Saint
Augustine, Lying, in 16 THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 45, 109 (Roy J. Deferrari ed., Sister
Mary Sarah Muldowney et al. trans., 1952) ("Whoever thinks, moreover, that there is any
kind of lie which is not a sin deceives himself sadly."). Lies were, for Kant, no more
justifiable by virtue of their consequences than would be other evil actions, such as murder or
theft. See KANT, supra, at 226.
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one's thoughts to someone through words that yet
(intentionally) contain the contrary of what the speaker
thinks on the subject is an end that is directly opposed to
the natural purposiveness of the speaker's capacity to
communicate his thoughts, and is thus a renunciation by
the speaker of his personality, and such a speaker is a
mere deceptive appearance of a [human being], not a
[human being] him [or her] self.
135
Indeed, so strong were his views on lying that he believed even lies that
were told with good intention were categorically wrong.
13
1
Neo-Kantians tend to agree that lying is an affront to autonomy.
Lies interfere with the victim's rational deliberation and rob the victim
of her prospects for making at least some sensible choices about a
course of action or belief.1 37  As Charles Fried has put it, lying is a
breach of trust:
Lying is wrong because when I lie I set up a relation
which is essentially exploitative. . . . Lying violates
respect and is wrong, as is any breach of trust. Every lie
is a broken promise [which] . . . is made and broken at
the same moment. Every lie necessarily implies-as does
every assertion-an assurance, a warranty of its truth. 138
Barbara Herman, along similar lines, has claimed that lying forces the
victim to become an instrument of the deceiver's purposes:
Using deceit to control access to facts, one moves
someone to deliberate on grounds she believes (falsely)
she has assessed on their merits. When deceit is effective,
it causes the victim to have the beliefs necessary for her
to adopt ends and choose actions that serve the
135. KANT, supra note 134, at 225-26.
136. Id.; see also IMMANUEL KANT, ON EDUCATION 104 (Annette Churton trans.,
Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 2003) (1899) ("[T]here is no single instance in which a lie can be
justified."); Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, in ETHICS
280 (Peter Singer ed., 1994).
137. According to Samuel Cook, freedom and coercion are generally "antithetical
relations or realities" such that "freedom entails the absence of coercion, and coercion
involves the absence of freedom." Samuel DuBois Cook, Coercion and Social Change, in
NoMos XIV: COERCION 107,126 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972).
138. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 67 (1978).
[92:423
2009] ENFORCEABILITY OF NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES
deceiver's purposes. The victim's will becomes an
instrument of the deceiver's ,31purposes-under the
deceiver's indirect causal control.
Under both Fried's and Herman's accounts, the moral problem with
lying is that it effectively allows the liar to control the victim's will.'"
Such control is incompatible with the view that the victim is a "possible
source of reasons all the way down."'41
Of course, one might disagree with this concern, at least as framed.
After all, controlling another's will is not, per se, objectionable. Many
contract rules, not to mention many other laws, deal with controlling the
will of another.'42 Similarly, even rational persuasion aims, in some
sense, to control the will of another.'43 Thus, the moral reprehensibility
of lies must turn on the manner in which the control gets exercised, not
merely the fact of control. In this vein, Christine Korsgaard argues that
139. BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACrICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 228 (1993). David
Strauss has advanced a similar argument with respect to restrictions on free speech. See
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334, 354 (1991). Strauss advances what he calls the "persuasion principle," which essentially
provides that "harmful consequences resulting from the persuasive effects of speech may not
be any part of the justification for restricting speech." Id. at 335. Strauss excludes lies from
the protection of the persuasion principle, however, because the liar effectively subjects her
listener to a form of "mental slavery." Id. at 354.
140. See, e.g., 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 378 (2d ed. 1986)
("The type of interest protected by the law of deceit is the interest in formulating business
judgments without being misled by others-in short, in not being cheated. Generally, the law
of deceit is limited to misrepresentations that mislead another into an unwise judgment in
some business enterprise resulting in financial loss." (footnote omitted)). In this sense, lying
resembles other forms of coercion, including duress. See, e.g., Rick Bigwood, Coercion in
Contract. The Theoretical Constructs of Duress, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 201,208 (1996) ("What a
party really complains about when she alleges duress is not that she is altogether deprived of
her will but, as with fraud, that her will has been subjected to a motive for 'intentional' action
from which she ought to have been free.").
141. HERMAN, supra note 139, at 230; see also Douglas N. Husak, Paternalism and
Autonomy, 10 PHILO. & PUB. AFF. 27, 28 (1980) ("Deontological theories often employ the
notion of moral autonomy to stress the dignity and inviolability of the person. What is
valuable about persons, according to this tradition, is their ability to follow laws that are self-
imposed, formulated by exercises of their capacity to deliberate and reason.").
142. See Bigwood, supra note 140, at 201 ("Certainly in the negotiations leading up to a
contract, some degree of persuasion and pressure is both likely and expected, especially in
arm's-length commercial context.").
143. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central,
Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1114 (2006) ("One
can argue that other forms of persuasion resting on, say, charisma or personal charm, or even
the overbearing persistence of a used car salesman, also might treat the listener
instrumentally.").
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
lying is wrong because it treats victims in ways to which they cannot
assent:
People cannot assent to a way of acting when they are
given no chance to do so. The most obvious instance of
this is when coercion is used. But it is also true of
deception: the victim of the false promise cannot assent
to it because he doesn't know it is what he is being
offered. "
Thus, at least in Korsgaard's view, assent, or the lack thereof, may be
deemed the critical feature from a deontological perspective in
determining the morality of a lie. And, mirroring Kant, Korsgaard
contends that assent is logically impossible in the case of lies.'45
Many of the courts reluctant to enforce no-reliance clauses seem to
at least implicitly agree With this perspective. For instance, in the classic
Ganley case discussed previously, the Minnesota Supreme Court rested
much of the weight of its decision not to enforce a clear no-reliance
clause on the premise that "[f]raud destroys all consent.""'6  In the
Ganley court's view, fraud is corrosive, eroding whatever voluntary
choice there might have been to support the contract, including the no-
reliance clause, in the first place.'47 Similarly, in Arnold, the Second
Circuit determined that cases refusing to enforce no-reliance clauses
were correct because they were "based upon a greater consideration for
the individual who may suffer wrong through deliberate fraud" than
decisions enforcing such clauses.48 This argument favoring the
nonenforcement of no-reliance clauses turns on a decidedly
deontological perception of the morality of fraud.
Most modern moral philosophers, even of a deontological bent,
however, do not share Kant's and Korsgaard's view that lying is a
categorical wrong. In fact, much of the modern literature on lying aims
at uncovering the circumstances in which a person may be justified in
lying.'49 Lying may compromise autonomy because it undercuts a
144. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 138 (1996).
145. See id. at 138-39 (arguing that even if the victim knows about the lie, she "cannot
really assent to the transaction ... propose[d]").
146. Ganley Bros. v. Butler Bros. Bldg. Co., 212 N.W. 602, 603 (Minn. 1927).
147. See id.
148. Arnold v. Nat'l Aniline & Chem. Co., 20 F.2d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 1927).
149. See generally, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
LIFE (1978); Robert N. Van Wyk, When is Lying Morally Permissible? Casuistical Reflections
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victim's capacity to assent, but it hardly follows that it always does so.
Instead, as the law seems to recognize in a variety of other contexts, it is
possible to assent to a lie and thereby obviate any moral concerns
regarding it.'
Recognizing that assent to a lie is possible seems to comport with
common assumptions about lies that are permissible, both outside and
inside of legal contexts. For instance, few would argue that lying in
order to protect the secrecy of a surprise birthday party constitutes a
moral offense. Focusing on assent, a neo-Kantian could justify this
common reality by noting that the person celebrating the birthday
retrospectively assents to the lie. Similarly, few would argue that lying
during the course of a poker game constitutes a moral offense.
Not only is misleading behavior in this context
permissible and consistent with the general prohibition
on deception, but we do not much worry that our
behavior in poker games will corrode the relevant
aspects of our moral character-our resolve not to lie
and to take truth-telling and candor seriously.'5
This is so, a neo-Kantian might argue, because the participants in the
game have tacitly assented to the lies.
Even if one does not agree that these particular examples justify
lying-or even if one believes that establishing assent, even in these
contexts, requires more exacting proof-the point of this section is a
simple one: all but the most die-hard Kantians agree that lying is, at
least sometimes, justifiable. Thus, prohibitions against lying are not
categorical, and when such prohibitions conflict with other moral goods,
the other moral goods may, occasionally, prevail. This seems
particularly true in circumstances where a person may be said to have
assented to the lie or the possibility of a lie.
on the Game Analogy, Self-Defense, Social Contract Ethics, and Ideals, 24 J. VALUE INQUIRY
155 (1990); see also, e.g., BOK, supra, at 108-10 (arguing that intentional deception may be
morally acceptable in certain circumstances, such as to protect a murderer's intended,
innocent victim); Jonathan E. Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. PHIL. 435,
440-41 (1997) (disagreeing with Korsgaard's argument by showing situations in which one
might assent to being told a lie).
150. Some neo-Kantians would also urge that other justifications for lying may exist,
particularly in circumstances where the lie can prevent serious injury or death.
151. Shiffrin, supra note 131, at 743.
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B. Consequentialist Rationales
People depend on others to tell the truth. Cooperation requires
mutual honesty (at least most of the time). The duty to tell the truth (or
engage in "fair play") has gotten its most influential recent articulation
by John Rawls.
Suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of
social cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can
only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone,
cooperates. Suppose further that cooperation requires a
certain sacrifice from each person, or at least involves a
certain restriction of his liberty. Suppose finally that the
benefits produced by cooperation are, up to a certain
point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation is unstable
in the sense that if any one person knows that all (or
nearly all) of the others will continue to do their part, he
will still be able to share a gain from the scheme even if
he does not do his part. Under these conditions a person
who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by
a duty of fair play to do his part and not to take
advantage of the free benefit by not cooperating."2
Though Rawls himself was a self-professed neo-Kantian, this description
of mutual trust and cooperation has a consequentialist feel. 153
Indeed, consequentialists, like deontologists, tend to view lying as
morally reprehensible. Lies degrade the background of trust necessary
for mutually beneficial interaction.'54 John Stuart Mill, for example,
argued that lies undermine mutual trust, "the insufficiency of which
does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back
152. John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY:
A SYMPOSIUM 3, 9-10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964).
153. There are, of course, many varied forms of consequentialism. See generally, e.g.,
L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS (1996) (describing and discussing various
forms of consequentialist thought). For my limited purposes, however, Kent Greenawalt's
simple definition of a generic consequentialism suffices: "A practice has value from a
consequentialist point of view if it contributes to some desirable state of affairs.... The force
of a consequentialist reason is dependent on the factual connection between a practice and
the supposed results of the practice." Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 119, 128 (1989).
154. See, e.g., Michael Perelman, The Neglected Economics of Trust: The Bentham
Paradox and Its Implications, 57 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 381, 381-87 (1998) (arguing that
"[t]rust is a central component of the way people relate to society," and that it prevents
people from rationally pursuing self-maximizing strategies that would undermine society).
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civilisation, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest
scale depends."'55  And although consequentialists recognize that
prohibitions against lying are not categorical,16 they often argue for very
strong presumptions against lying, viewing individuals as ill-equipped to
judge the consequences of their deceptions.157
In the context of contractual disclaimers of reliance on
misrepresentations, it is worth focusing on a particularly strong
economic rationale that might be wielded to justify the decisions of
courts that are reluctant to enforce such disclaimers.'58 Contracts, in the
economic view, allow promisors to make credible promises and
representations 5 9 so that they can convince promisees to enter into
mutually beneficial transactions. A rational promisee will be convinced
only if she believes that the benefits of accepting a promise or
representation exceed the costs of relying on it. The benefits of a
promise or representation, in turn, hinge in substantial part on the
likelihood that the promisor will actually perform or that the
representation is accurate. Phrased slightly differently, any anticipated
benefit that a promisee might gain from a promised performance or
representation must be discounted by the possibility that the promisor
will not perform or that the representation is false.'6°
155. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD
445,455 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 260 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., 1950) ("[Flalsehood ... brings
on at last the dissolution of human society.").
156. By definition, consequentialists are willing to weigh the consequences of one value
or choice against another in order to ascertain the best course of action.
157. See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 155, at 260 (warning that the slightest lie is "a first
transgression which facilitates a second, and familiarizes the odious idea of a falsehood").
158. This discussion is based, in substantial part, on Chapter 5 of Ian Ayres and Gregory
Klass's book, Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented Intent. See AYRES & KLASS,
supra note 127, at 83-112.
159. Promises, of course, may be credible in the absence of legal enforcement. See, e.g.,
H. Lorne Carmichael, Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle Incentives, 3 J.
ECON. PERSP. 65, 67 (1989) ("Self-enforcing contracts are collections of promises that, while
they might not be legally binding, are nonetheless credible. Everyone can be confident that
the promises will be kept."); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite
Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1646 (2003) ("[W]e know that contracts often are
performed even in the absence of any legal sanctions for breach."). Various self-enforcement
mechanisms may, in a given situation, suffice to render a promise or representation
sufficiently credible to convince a promisee to enter into a transaction with a promisor. These
self-enforcement mechanisms include reputational sanctions, loss of repeat business with the
promisor, and norms of reciprocity. See Scott, supra, at 1646-47.
160. In other words, the promisee must engage in an expected value exercise. Expected
value is the probability of the event occurring multiplied by the value of the event occurring.
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Of course, even when a promisor has a sincere desire to perform,
circumstances can arise that make performance impossible,
impracticable, or inefficient. Similarly, even the most earnest promisors
may be wrong about the representations that they make. Thus, a
promisee can never know for certain that a promise will be fulfilled or
that a representation is true.161 But the doctrine of fraudulent
inducement operates to dissuade promisors from at least intentionally
misrepresenting the likelihood of their performance or the truthfulness
of their assertions. The doctrine, therefore, serves to help promisees
more accurately estimate the likelihood of a promised performance or
the truthfulness of a represented fact. It thus helps the promisee avoid
the expensive precaution costs that she might otherwise incur in an
effort to avoid fraudulent transactions. 162 Additionally, regular
enforcement of the doctrine by courts serves to bolster the credibility of
promises and representations made by promisors. Promisors and
promisees can, accordingly, bargain more efficiently over prices, and
promisees can make decisions about optimal investments and
precautions against nonperformance or inaccuracies.
Viewed in this light, the doctrine of fraudulent inducement plays a
critical role in effective and efficient contract design.'63 But this role is
far from immutable. The critical concern should be giving promisees the
ability to estimate the likelihood of a promised performance or the
truthfulness of a represented fact. "[T]here are many situations in which
a promisee can find it in his interest to rely even though the promisor
See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 566-67 (1998)
(explaining basic economic principles underlying expected value analysis).
161. There may be, in fact, good reasons to think that even promisors acting in good
faith and with no active intent to dissemble might over-solicit sunk costs from the promisee in
order to reduce uncertainty. This over-solicitation subjects the promisee to the same hazard
of opportunistic exploitation as does an intentional lie about the likelihood or quality of
performance. See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard and
Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621,629 (1993).
162. See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal
Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623,630-31 (1992).
163. Rules against fraud can also be said to avoid investment inefficiencies. As Paul
Mahoney explains:
Because a lie can produce a wealth transfer to defendants that would have
been impossible in an honest market transaction, defendants will have an
incentive to devote a positive amount of resources to lying. Such
investments are a source of net social cost because any positive allocative
outcomes they produce could be achieved through an honest market
transaction.
Id. at 631.
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does not intend to perform" or the promisor does not guarantee the
veracity of his factual representation."" Promisees may find it in their
interest to rely on promises, even if the promisor may not perform or
may not be telling the truth about a fact, so long as the benefits of such
reliance outweigh the costs. So long as promisees are put on notice
through a no-reliance clause that the likelihood of performance or of the
veracity of a represented fact is low, there is no good reason to second
guess the promisee's estimation of her participation constraint.
16
As with the generic deontological justifications for prohibiting lying,
then, consequentialist, and particularly economic, rationales for
prohibiting lying in contractual dealings may give way, in appropriate
circumstances, to countervailing moral goods. Consequentialist
objections to lying are not categorical.
C. The Bottom Line
Dean William L. Prosser once criticized an excessively
compartmentalized approach to legal analysis that suggests that "east is
east and west is west, and never the twain shall meet," because in reality
"there are, of course, no such distinctly segregated compartments in the
law."' 66 He went on to argue that "[t]he first question which arises in
this curious dichotomy [between contract and tort law] is, when is a
breach of contract also a tort? It is obvious that [there cannot be a tort
in every breach of contract case] ... or there would be no distinction left
at all." 1
67
Contract liability is imposed by the law for the protection
of a single, limited interest, that of having the promises of
others performed .... [Tort law] is directed toward the
compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for
losses which they have suffered within the scope of their
legally recognized interests generally, rather than one
interest only, where the law considers that compensation
is required."
164. AYRES & KLASS, supra note 127, at 93.
165. To be clear, I am assuming that the parties to a contract containing a no-reliance
clause are sophisticated and that no other bargaining improprieties are present.
166. Prosser, supra note 14, at 380.
167. Id. at 387.
168. KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, § 1, at 5-6.
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In those tricky cases where the primary purposes of each area of the law
overlap or conflict, as is the case with no-reliance clauses, the "single
guiding principle," in Dean Prosser's view, is that tort "liability must be
[levied against only that] conduct which is socially unreasonable."' 69
In the context of no-reliance clauses, the conduct that could
potentially be subject to liability is fraud. As the generic deontological
and consequentialist arguments rehearsed in the previous sections
suggest, fraud constitutes, as a general matter, "socially unreasonable"
conduct. Importantly, however, fraud is not categorically unreasonable.
In other words, there are other social goods that can, in proper
circumstances, offset the need to impose liability for fraud.
In the context of this Article, then, the question becomes whether
enforcement of no-reliance clauses generates social goods weighty
enough to offset the need to impose liability for fraud. By asking this
question, I am not suggesting that the value of moral prohibitions
against fraud is commensurable with the value of contractual freedom.
"In the commensurabilist model, other things being equal, if we can
compare two options in terms of which is more just, or which produces
more utility, then we should pick the option that offers more of the
property."'70 But to say that two values cannot precisely be measured
and ranked against each other along a single metric is not to say "that
the two options cannot be compared at all, or ranked as better or worse
than the other.''. "When it is impossible to deliberate rationally among
options by judging which option has more of some desired property, but
it is still possible to deliberate rationally, the objects of deliberation are
incommensurably valuable."'72
169. Id. at 6.
170. Strudler, supra note 133, at 1531-32. Henry Richardson explains the
commensurability thesis this way:
Two values (or goods) are deliberatively commensurable with respect to a
given choice if and only if there is some single norm (or good) such that
the considerations put forward by those two values (or goods) for and
against choosing each of the available options may be adequately arrayed
prior to the choice (for purposes of deliberation) simply in terms of the
greater or lesser satisfaction of that norm (or instantiation of that good).
HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 104 (1994).
171. Stephen Gardbaum, Law, Incommensurability, and Expression, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1687, 1687 (1998) (distinguishing between incomparability and incommensurability). For an
overview of incommensurability, see Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1-3 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
172. Strudler, supra note 133, at 1533.
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in that deliberation.
173
Instead, this Article merely argues that, to date, most courts have failed
to meaningfully engage in such deliberation, simply assuming that no-
reliance clauses can have no legitimate value, and serve only to
countenance fraud. As the next Part demonstrates, however, the
assumption that courts have been making is wrong. There are
compelling and legitimate reasons why parties might benefit from no-
reliance clauses.
IV. "UNRAVELING CERTAIN HUMAN LOTS": LEGITIMATE REASONS
WHY CONTRACTING PARTIES MIGHT USE NO-RELIANCE CLAUSES
AND WANT THEM ENFORCED
I at least have so much to do in unraveling certain human
lots, and seeing how they were woven and interwoven,
that all the light I can command must be concentrated on
this particular web, and not dispersed over that tempting
range of relevancies called the universe."'
A significant number of commercial parties include no-reliance
clauses in their contracts."' Despite this reality, many courts remain
skeptical of such clauses. These courts reductively view no-reliance
173. As Alasdair MacIntyre has suggested, there may be good reasons to doubt how
successful such a deliberation can ultimately prove with respect to all fundamental questions:
[T]he great Enlightenment theorists had themselves disagreed both
morally and philosophically. Their heirs have, through brilliant and
sophisticated feats of argumentation, made it evident that if these
disagreements are not interminable, they are such at least that after two
hundred years no prospect of termination is in sight. Succeeding
generations of Kantians, utilitarians, natural rights' theorists, and
contractarians show no signs of genuine convergence.
2 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered, in ETHICS AND
POLITICS: SELECTED ESSAYS 172, 181-82 (2006). Nevertheless, as MacIntyre has also
suggested, in solving particular problems, we can learn a great deal from utilitarian and
Kantian approaches to moral philosophy. See 2 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Truthfulness and
Lies: What Can We Learn from Kant?, in ETHICS AND POLITICS: SELECTED ESSAYS 122,
122-42 (2006) (investigating Kantian responses to a variety of moral questions); 2 ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, Truthfulness and Lies: What Can We Learn from Kant?, in ETHICS AND
POLITICS: SELECTED ESSAYS 101, 101-21 (2006) (investigating utilitarian responses to a
variety of moral questions).
174. GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH 141 (Rosemary Ashton ed., Penguin Books 2003)
(1871).
175. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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clauses as nothing more than licenses to lie.'76 As Part III argued, these
courts then use generic moral prohibitions against lying to conclude that
no-reliance clauses should not be enforced or should be enforced only
subject to substantial limitations. This Part contends that courts
skeptical of no-reliance clauses mistakenly fail to consider several
plausible and legitimate reasons why parties might want to include no-
reliance clauses in their contracts and have such clauses enforced.
The animating intuition behind the arguments advanced in this Part
is that parties are, in general, the best judges of their self-interest and
that they enter into contracts because they expect mutual gains from
trade. 7 If this intuition accurately describes at least some commercial
dealings, then a more thoroughgoing exploration of why commercial
parties often include no-reliance clauses in their contracts is needed.
One possible explanation for the presence of no-reliance clauses in
commercial contracts might be that, with respect to such clauses, parties
systematically suffer from one or more cognitive biases that impair their
ability to make rational judgments. A number of biases could vie for
contention here. For instance, people might be overly optimistic or
confident, particularly when they are investing in contractual
preparations.178 This overconfidence could cause them to underestimate
the extent to which they are likely to be defrauded. 79 Alternatively (or
in addition), people may be poor at calculating the probabilities of
future events, especially risks. This calculating deficiency may cause
people to systematically underestimate the risk that they will be
defrauded. 180 Individuals might also suffer from what is often referred
to as a "personal positivity bias," which leads people to generally
perceive others in a positive light. If a person is honest, she may view
others as honest, even if such a view is naive. Coupled with the concept
176. See supra Part II.B-C.
177. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) ("[C]ontract law should facilitate the efforts of
contracting parties to maximize the joint gains (the 'contractual surplus') from transactions.").
178. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 144, 149 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) ("One of the most
robust findings in the literature of individual decision making is that of the systematic
tendency of many people to overrate their own abilities, contributions, and talents.").
179. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 362-63 (2003).
180. See id. at 363-64.
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of cognitive dissonance,'8 individuals may be especially reluctant to
reach the conclusion that they have made a mistake in deciding to trust
someone."8 Finally, people may simply be very bad at detecting fraud,
though they think they have the ability to do so,'83 and they might be
particularly susceptible to oral communications, even when they have
the intention to rely only on written communications." Given the
sophistication of the parties involved, however, and considering their
diversity, as well as the diversity of transaction types in which no-
reliance clauses are used, it is difficult to imagine any pattern of
cognitive bias that could account for all of the uses of no-reliance
clauses. '85
In contrast, several rational reasons exist for parties to enter into no-
reliance clauses. First, a seller might want to include a no-reliance
clause because, ex ante, it believes that there is a high risk that the buyer
will try to hold the seller up by asserting, ex post, that the seller made
fraudulent assertions. A no-reliance clause operates as a barrier to such
a holdup problem. Sellers may be acutely concerned about the risk of a
holdup in complex deals for at least two reasons: (1) in such deals,
numerous different interactions between different buyer and seller
agents on multiple facets of the deal may take place, potentially making
the costs of verifying to a court that no fraud actually occurred
particularly high; and (2) in such deals, the assertions being made may
themselves be complex, thus increasing the risks that a court will
erroneously conclude that an assertion was fraudulent when, in fact, it
was merely negligent, inadvertent, or not factually incorrect at all.
Second, a seller might want to include a no-reliance clause in
situations where its agents are heavily involved in making pre-
contractual and contractual representations, it is expensive for the seller
to monitor its agents' conduct, and the buyer might be in a better
position to monitor or observe the agents or protect itself against the
agents' actions at a lower cost. Third, buyers or sellers might want to
181. See, e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)
(describing cognitive dissonance as the tendency to suppress information inconsistent with
positions taken in order to preserve psychological consistency).
182. See Prentice, supra note 179, at 365.
183. See id. at 366-67.
184. See id. at 369-71.
185. Significantly, there is little research to suggest that firms suffer from cognitive
biases. To the contrary, it is likely that firms tend to correct for cognitive biases due to
market pressures, even if individuals in the firm suffer from them. See Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 177, at 550-54.
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include a no-reliance clause in order to enhance precontractual
information exchange, particularly in complex transactions where the
functionality of a product or service may hinge, in part, on how that
product or service interacts with the buyer's particular business.
Inclusion of a no-reliance clause may, in such circumstances, facilitate a
freer exchange of information by reducing the threat of postcontractual
allegations of fraud. Finally, buyers might want to include a no-reliance
clause in order to protect their legitimate investments in private (as
opposed to public) information about valuation.
Buyers (or sellers) might well be willing to acquiesce to a no-reliance
clause for at least three somewhat overlapping reasons. First, the
alternative might be to pay a higher contract price. One party may well
believe that it can protect itself against the other party's potentially
fraudulent assertions at a lower cost. A second, and closely related,
reason why a party might accept a no-reliance clause is that it may
believe that the risks of fraud are low. This may be especially true in
circumstances where the party either already has, or can inexpensively
obtain, sufficient information to gauge the truthfulness of the other
party's assertions. Finally, a party might accept a no-reliance clause
because it believes that nonlegal sanctions, such as reputational
sanctions or the threat of ceasing further dealings, which might
otherwise be crowded out or diminished by legal sanctions, are sufficient
deterrents to the other party's fraud.
A. Affirmative Reasons Why Parties Might Want to Include No-Reliance
Clauses and Have Them Enforced
1. Holdup by a Buyer Alleging Fraud
A seller may legitimately fear that sales representations it made to
the buyer could be turned against it after the contract exists. Complex
deals, as previously noted, often require that sellers and their agents
make numerous different representations at different times to different
constellations of the buyers' agents. The volume of representations
made in complex deals, coupled with the diversity of players involved,
increases the likelihood of misunderstandings and confusion.186 As deals
get more and more complicated, buyers have increasing opportunities to
186. The possibility of confusion may be particularly acute in complex transactions, as
Part IV.A.3 suggests, because sellers may not know everything about their products or
services, at least in the context of the buyer's proposed use or need for those products or
services.
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allege fraudulent inducement. This sort of allegation threatens to
impose significant costs on a seller and thus gives a buyer leverage that
it can use after contract formation to renegotiate the terms of the deal in
its favor. ,7
The most obvious costs are those related to the development of a
factual and legal defense. Deception can be difficult to detect, even after
the fact.' 8  Unless the seller had in place extensive and costly
monitoring allowing it not only to observe all of the representations
made by its agents during precontractual negotiations' 9 but also to
translate those observations into verifiable evidence for a future court,
the seller will face expensive challenges in reconstructing the events
surrounding alleged incidents of fraud.' 90 But such a reconstruction is
vital. Fraud cases are fact-intensive. Indeed, other than having to clear
relatively minor pleading hurdles, 91 a plaintiff alleging fraud stands a
very good chance of surviving any pretrial efforts that a defendant might
make to cut short the litigation. Even if a seller is absolutely convinced
187. Holdup problems, like this one, occupy the attentions of many contract and
organizational theorists. See, e.g., CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION 7
(Scott E. Masten ed., 1996); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 685-87, 693-702 (2007).
188. See, e.g., Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount
of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 67-77 (1973) (discussing cases in which providers of repair
service falsely diagnose a need for the service and considering how difficult it can be, ex post,
to discover this fraud).
189. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966-67 (1984) (describing how parties
may undertake inefficient precautions); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 289 (1986) (same).
As discussed in Part IV.A.2, there may be circumstances in which it is less costly for
buyers to monitor sellers' agents. In the absence of a no-reliance clause, however, a buyer
might not be sufficiently motivated to invest in such monitoring, banking instead on its ability
to hold the seller liable for fraud if the seller's agent acts inappropriately.
190. For a discussion of the distinctions between observable and verifiable information
in the contractual setting, see Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis
of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 279-80 (1992).
191. Fraud, in most jurisdictions, must be pleaded with "particularity." See, e.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 9(b). The requirement of pleading the circumstances of an alleged fraud with
particularity, however, "does not render the general principles of simplicity set forth in Rule 8
entirely inapplicable to pleadings alleging fraud; rather, as a significant number of federal
courts from throughout the country have said over the years .... the two rules must be read in
conjunction with each other." 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1298 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2008). In Judge
Easterbrook's now-famous words, Rule 9(b) requires the plaintiff to plead at most the "first
paragraph of any newspaper story." DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.
1990). Thus the particularity requirement does not pose a substantial hurdle, in most cases, to
fraud claims.
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(and correct) that it did not commit fraud, mustering sufficient evidence
to defeat a motivated buyer's claims can be very costly.
Moreover, even when a seller is prepared to raise its defense, the
dispute resolution process itself imposes significant costs on the seller.
This is particularly true with respect to fraud claims because, as just
noted, such claims stand a good chance of surviving until the end of a
trial on the merits. Sellers faced with fraud claims, then, are likely to be
forced to incur legal fees through a trial and then face the
unpredictability of the legal system. Specifically, sellers run the risk that
courts will not be able to distinguish accurately between representations
that were fraudulent and representations that were merely inaccurate or
puffery.'" In the context of fraud claims, the costs associated with an
erroneous judgment may be compounded by the threat of punitive
damages."'
In short, in our system, a trial often constitutes a failure.
Although we celebrate [the trial] as the centerpiece of
our system of justice, we know that trial is not only an
uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a
disfavored one. . . . Much of our civil procedure is
justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid
trial. More important, the nature of our civil process
192. Litigation necessarily includes the risk that a court will err in its judgment. This risk
is frequently referred to as an error cost.
Error costs are the social costs associated with erroneous legal
judgments and are a function of several variables. Erroneous judgments
include decisions for undeserving defendants (Type I errors) and
decisions for undeserving plaintiffs (Type II errors). The expected cost of
each individual error is the product of the probability of the error (q, or
q,) and the magnitude of the error (EC or EC2). Total error costs
additionally depend on the fraction of defendants who are truly liable (k)
and the total quantity of litigation (Q). In the loss function expressed
above, total Type I error costs are kQqEC, and total Type II error costs
are (1-k)QqEC. The probability of error (q, or q2), will depend on
several variables: the standard of proof used by the court, the allocation of
burdens, and the court's level of confidence in the accuracy of its decision.
Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof- The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997 BYU L. REV. 1,
5 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
193. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1381 (2000) (noting the possibility of
punitive damages when intentional misrepresentation is "sufficiently malicious or
oppressive").
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drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays,
and uncertainties of trial .... "
The fear of a potential fraud claim can cast a long shadow over
completed transactions, generating instability. Judge Posner concisely
summarized these concerns when considering a party's attempt to attach
a tort claim for fraud to its breach of contract claim:
There is a risk of turning every breach of contract suit
into a fraud suit, of circumventing the limitation that the
doctrine of consideration is supposed however ineptly to
place on making all promises legally enforceable, and of
thwarting the rule that denies the award of punitive
damages for breach of contract.195
In light of the costs associated with defending against a buyer's fraud
claim, it is not surprising that a seller might worry that a buyer will hold
it up in an effort to renegotiate the contract. To account for this
possibility, sellers might either increase the price of the deal for the
buyer, to offset this risk, or offer to include a no-reliance clause that
either eliminates or reduces the seller's potential liability for fraud.
2. Agency Monitoring Costs
A seller might want to include a no-reliance clause in its contract
with a buyer because it is concerned about the discretion given to its
agents and the possibility than an agent will make either an intentional
misrepresentation to a buyer or a representation that could be mistaken
for an intentional misrepresentation. Agents, after all, may have their
own independent strategies to pursue during the course of their work
for the seller, and these strategies may not line up with the seller's
194. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (footnote
omitted).
195. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Charles
Miller, Comment, Contortions Over Contorts: A Distinct Damages Requirement?, 28 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1257, 1263 (1997) (citing Laurence P. Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of
Contract, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 284, 284 (1959)) (noting that potentially at stake in fraudulent
inducement cases "are punitive damages, which are generally unavailable for a breach of
contract, but which may be available in cases where the conduct in question constitutes both a
breach of contract and a tort").
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goals.' 96 In the face of concern about its agents' representations, a seller
can, of course, take precautions such as monitoring the agent in order to
catch and correct any misrepresentations before they are communicated
to, or at least relied on by, the buyer.'9 It may be difficult, however, for
the seller to monitor all of its representations, especially on a regular
basis. And, even if such monitoring can be done, "[i]t is quite possible
for an agent to make a fraudulent misrepresentation even though the
enterprise has taken all reasonable precautions to prevent him from
doing so.' 198 In any event, such monitoring will be costly, and in at least
some circumstances, it may well be that the buyer can protect itself
against misrepresentations made by the seller's agent at a lower cost.1
After all, the buyer "is in an excellent position to be aware of all the
representations that have been made by the agent and whether they are
material.''2°
But a buyer may not be motivated, in the absence of a no-reliance
clause, to expend its resources in monitoring the seller's agent's
representations. 20' If a seller's agent makes a misrepresentation, the
196. See, e.g., Robert E. Benfield, Comment, Curing American Managerial Myopia: Can
the German System of Corporate Governance Help?, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 615,
617 (1995) (noting that "[c]orporate managers necessarily pursue short-term growth strategies
in order to appease their shareholder[] and thereby significantly increase the cost of funding
long-term research and development").
197. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1057-58 (1993) (noting that without a
reward/punish mechanism, agents may shirk responsibilities). There are a variety of other
precautions that sellers can, and likely will, take, such as training agents, providing agents
with incentives, expressly limiting the authority of agents, and randomly sampling.the work of
agents. See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. &
POL'y REV. 265, 276 (1998) (discussing some monitoring and control mechanisms, including
that principals may reward agents to encourage them to act in the principals' best interests).
For the purposes of this argument, however, I presume that most of these precautions would
be taken by a seller regardless of the particular structure of the seller's agreement with a
buyer. This presumption rests on the intuition that, in an agency relationship, the principal
decides whether to invest before the agent has acted. Thus, the principal necessarily faces a
moral-hazard problem because the agent has the choice of either cooperating and investing or
appropriating the principal's investment. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a
Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1643, 1657-77 (1996) (discussing an agent's choice). Principals are thus likely to
take precautions to ensure that their agents act appropriately.
198. Davis, supra note 13, at 509.
199. "In many situations,... it will be impossible for an enterprise to monitor all of the
pre-contractual representations being made by its agents at a reasonable cost.... In these
types of situations it might be useful to recruit the enterprise's trading partner to assist in the
process of monitoring the agent." Id. at 511-12.
200. Id. at 512.
201. Id.
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buyer can sue the seller for fraud. °2 Thus, without a no-reliance clause,
the seller could bear an inefficiently large cost-the cost of monitoring
its agents-that could otherwise be shared between the parties. While
the seller can certainly charge more for its product in order to offset
these costs, in many states a no-reliance clause limiting or eliminating
fraud liability for the seller might more efficiently fit the actual needs of
the parties.
3. Information Streamlining
A seller might also want to include a no-reliance clause in her
contract with a buyer in order to enhance incentives for information
exchange. In complex transactions, the standard binary adage that
sellers know everything about their products or services and buyers
know everything about their needs or desires may not hold true.
Instead, a seller may be offering a complex good or service that has
unique characteristics or features in the context of a buyer's particular
objectives. In such circumstances, the accuracy of a seller's assertions
about its goods or services may hinge, in significant part, on a high
degree of information exchange between the parties. In order to make
truthful representations about its product or service, a seller might need
detailed information from a buyer about its business, but in order to
understand what information about its business is relevant, a buyer
might need detailed information about a seller's product or service.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, sellers may not be able to
accurately discern what aspects of their products or services are most
relevant to buyers' needs-are material, in the parlance of fraud2" 3-
without a high degree of information exchange.
Although parties generally have incentives to share information
during contractual negotiations, in order to ensure that beneficial trade
is possible,"" in the context of particularly complex goods or services,
these natural incentives may not be strong enough to ensure free
exchange. In the absence of a no-reliance clause insulating it from
future threats of fraud, a seller may be reticent to engage in the
necessary exchange-or may engage in this exchange only after charging
202. This, of course, may be an exaggeration. In many instances, it may still be in the
buyer's interests to monitor the seller's agent because the costs associated with proving-
verifying-any misrepresentations to a court are greater than the costs of monitoring.
203. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977) (stating that "[r]eliance
upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable unless the matter misrepresented is
material" and then describing the materiality requirement).
204. See Johnston, supra note 36, at 390.
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a higher contract price-for fear that its incomplete and potentially
inaccurate assertions may later be used against it. On the other side, in
the absence of a no-reliance clause, a buyer may not be induced to
gather and share necessary information about its needs or desires,
preferring instead to foist all of the risks and costs associated with such
an investigation onto the seller. In these cases, and in the absence of an
enforceable no-reliance clause, deals either may not get made or may
get made only at suboptimal prices.
No-reliance clauses, in this context, can effectively give the seller a
little more freedom to share information and give the buyer a little more
incentive to gather information. Importantly, this rationale for the
existence of no-reliance clauses extends the intuition behind arguments
that favor limiting the liability of parties for promissory estoppel based
on precontractual representations.' °5  Professor Jason Johnston, for
instance, has argued that in some instances there will be no need for
legal liability to attach to precontractual negotiations (and that legal
liability would, in fact, be counterproductive) because the parties
themselves will have a private incentive to engage in "'cheap talk." ''
"[W]hen the parties have at least some interests in common, even cheap
talk-talk that involves no direct cost-may be credible and
informative."2 °7 In these circumstances, the parties will have private
incentives to engage truthfully and accurately in cheap talk about the
probabilities and characteristics of performance because of the "parties'
mutual interest in minimizing wasteful expense in investigating and
negotiating when there is in fact no possibility of mutually beneficial
trade."2 8 When, however, "a speaker is held legally liable for damages
if trade does not occur after the speaker makes a promissory (or more
generally) optimistic statement in courtship, that message is, as an
economic matter, no longer cheap talk. 2 °9' While Professor Johnston
does not argue that all promissory estoppel liability should be
eliminated, he suggests that at least in some circumstances, cheap talk
may be more efficient than the legally mandated alternatives.2"0 No-
reliance clauses allow parties to talk "cheaply" without fear of legal
sanction for fraud.
205. See generally, e.g., id.
206. Id. at 389 (footnote omitted).
207. Id. at 390.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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4. Protecting Investments in Private Information
Buyers (or potentially sellers) might want to include no-reliance
clauses, which in this context would insulate them from liability for
misstatements made in buyers' warranties, in order to protect their
investment in private information. For example, a real estate developer
might want to buy a parcel of property P2 because it already owns an
adjacent parcel P' and knows that P' will be turned into a strip mall (with
a Barnes & Noble and a variety of other high-traffic stores). The
developer wants P2 because she believes that she can turn it into a gas
station and make a great deal of money. In the course of negotiations,
the current owner of P2 might inquire about whether the developer
knows anything about what is being done with P'. The developer could,
of course, say nothing. But she then runs the risk of having the current
owner of P2 suspect that she is hiding something and hold out for more
money. Alternatively, the developer could tell the current owner of P'
about the strip mall plans, thus virtually guaranteeing a holdup. Finally,
the developer could lie. If she does so, however, she might well face a
potential fraud claim.
No-reliance clauses, in this context, serve to foster productive
investment in information-gathering by allowing buyers to protect that
investment. Twenty years ago, Professor Kronman advanced the
argument that contract law can tolerate nondisclosure by one who is
protecting such an investment.2' Although he went on to dismiss the
possibility that affirmative misrepresentations could also be allowed,"'
others have been more bold."3 Professor Levmore, for instance, has
argued that because "nondisclosure on the part of the buyer [is
conceptually permissible] in order to maintain a socially beneficial
incentive structure," it does not make sense to allow sellers to
211. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-18 (1978). Professor Kronman used a similar scenario, based on a
real dispute, to illustrate his arguments. In the dispute, a large company, Texas Gulf Sulphur,
spent time and money conducting aerial surveys of land in Ontario, Canada, and concluded
that there was a likelihood of valuable mineral deposits under farmland owned by the estate
of Murray Hendrie. Based on this information, Texas Gulf Sulphur purchased an option for
effectively $18,000 on mineral and surface rights in the Hendrie property. It turned out that
mineral deposits under the Hendrie tract were worth approximately $1 billion. In Professor
Kronman's view, if the Hendrie property sellers were entitled to learn the Texas Gulf's
private valuation information, the sellers would gain an unwarranted windfall. Id.
212. Id. at 19 n.49.
213. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 138-42 (1982) (arguing that the law should tolerate affirmative
misrepresentation in some circumstances).
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undermine this structure by merely asking, "'Do you have any
information about properties or developments in this area of the world
such that if I shared your knowledge, I would be likely to raise my sale
price by ten percent or more?' 214 In such circumstances, society's
interests may well be served by allowing the buyer to give a dishonest
answer, since that is the only way of protecting its informational
investment.
A relevant and similar right to lie is now commonly defended in the
jurisprudence of corporations. In some circumstances, it may make
sense to allow executives, acting on behalf of a corporation
contemplating a major transaction, such as the acquisition of another
corporation, to lie about their intentions, when such lies protect the
interests of their shareholders by limiting speculation that might
increase the price of stock in the corporation to be acquired. Defenders
of this right to lie argue that shareholders sometimes should be
permitted to vote to give executives the express right to lie to them.2
On the other hand, allowing buyers to have a free pass to lie to
sellers without any warning whatsoever may be too extreme. No-
reliance clauses strike a balance, allowing buyers to protect their
informational investments while also putting sellers on notice that they
should discount buyers' representations when calculating their
participation constraint.
B. Reasons Why Parties Might Acquiesce to the Inclusion of a No-
Reliance Clause
1. Lower Costs of Self-Protection
A buyer may agree to the inclusion of a no-reliance clause because,
in exchange, it can demand a lower price for the goods or services from
the seller. The savings may well be greater than what the buyer believes
it will spend in taking precautions to guard against seller fraud. This
214. Id. at 138, 139.
215. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (1990) (suggesting
that it is legally acceptable under a "fiduciary duty analysis" for a corporation publicly and
falsely to deny involvement in merger negotiations when "a rational shareholder group would
have endorsed [this] strategy"); see also Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How
Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 997 (1991) (arguing that there is a
default "fiduciary duty to tell the truth" that corporations can avoid by contracting "to waive
this warranty").
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straightforward cost-benefit rationale fits comfortably with the next two
rationales that may entice a buyer to accept a no-reliance clause.
2. Low Risk of Seller Fraud
Buyers may agree to the inclusion of a no-reliance clause because
they view the risk of seller fraud to be very low. Buyers may view the
risk as low because, in the particular circumstances of the transaction,
they have access to sufficient information to determine, at a low cost,
the veracity of seller's representations. Alternatively, the buyer may not
care about the veracity of the seller's representations because the buyer
may be relying exclusively on its own evaluation of the seller's goods or
services, without regard to the seller's representations. Finally, the
buyer may trust the seller because of repeated interactions with the
seller.
3. Equivalency or Superiority of Extra-Legal Sanctions
Finally, a buyer may agree to a no-reliance clause because it
concludes that extra-legal sanctions available to deter seller fraud are
sufficient, or perhaps even superior to, legal sanctions."' Extra-legal or
informal enforcement mechanisms may include reputational sanctions,
opportunities for repeat business interactions, and norms of reciprocal
fairness. 217  Essentially, all of these mechanisms provide credibility to
contractual commitments and representations without the need for
third-party (court) ef2m 8
In general, contracting parties want to earn and maintain a good
reputation with potential contracting partners and the general business
216. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON 757, 780-89 (1993) (finding that the
market value of the common stock of corporations that were either alleged to have
committed fraud or were convicted of fraud fell significantly following announcement of the
allegations or conviction and that very little of the fall in value could be attributed to
expected legal penalties).
217. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 159, at 1644-45.
218. Numerous commentators have analyzed the merits and risks of self-enforcing
contracts. See generally, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces
in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Stewart Macaulay, An
Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465; Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Robert E. Scott,
Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987); L.G. Telser,
A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing
Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177 (1985).
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community. 29  A good reputation helps generate future business
opportunities with high-caliber contracting partners, and it enhances
one's self-esteem.22 ' The threat of having a good reputation sullied can
often operate to prevent one contracting party from opportunistically
exploiting the other. Similarly, the prospects of future dealings with a
contracting partner often operate to curb opportunistic behavior.22 ' But
even in circumstances where reputational sanctions or concerns about
future business dealings are not powerful enough to prevent nefarious
behavior, there are strong reasons to believe that norms222 of reciprocal
fairness can ensure fair dealings.223 Experimental evidence indicates
that a preference for reciprocity-the willingness to reward cooperation
219. See, e.g., Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval
Trade, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 287, 287-95
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing how cultural and social standing impact self-
enforcement); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 177, at 557.
220. Though powerful, reputational sanctions may have distinct limits. The threat of
reputation sanctions works best to deter opportunistic conduct when other potential trading
partners and the business community can easily learn why a deal broke down. Reputational
sanctions, then, tend to work most effectively in small communities where information travels
swiftly. See, e.g., Greif, supra note 219, at 287-95.
221. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 159, at 1646 ("[Wjhere parties contemplate repeated
interactions, neither party will breach an agreement if the expected gains from breaching are
less than the expected returns from future transactions that breach would sacrifice."). Like
reputational sanctions, however, the threat of losing future dealings has limits, particularly
when parties believe that a relationship is about to end. See id. ("[T]he anticipation of the last
transaction may cause the entire cooperative pattern to unravel.").
222. Different definitions of the term "norms" abound in legal scholarship. See, e.g.,
Cooter, supra note 197, at 1656-57 (defining norms as imposing obligations); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1999) (defining
norms as "all rules and regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and
organizational rules"); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as "informal social regularities that
individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear
of external non-legal sanctions, or both"); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699-1701 (1996) (defining norms as rules distinguishing
desirable and undesirable behaviors while giving a third party the authority to punish those
engaging in behaviors that are undesirable); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from
Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 364 n.24 (2003) (defining
norms as "behavioral regularities that arise when humans are interacting with each other");
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) (using a
rough definition of norms as "social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what
ought to be done and what ought not to be done").
223. "Recent work in experimental economics suggests ...that the domain of self-
enforcing contracts may be considerably larger than has been conventionally understood. A
robust result of these experiments is that a significant fraction of individuals behave as if
reciprocity were an important motivation (even in isolated interactions with strangers) ... 
Scott, supra note 159, at 1644.
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and to punish selfishness-can motivate cooperation even in arms-
length interactions between complete strangers.
24
All of these informal enforcements of norms against fraud may have
several advantages over formal legal enforcement. 25  First, informal
enforcement avoids the direct institutional costs of legal enforcement.
Perhaps most significantly, informal enforcement can kick in even if the
parties can only observe-but could not, at a reasonable cost, verify to a
court-violations of the norms against fraud. Moreover, informal
enforcement has other advantages, especially in the context of fraud. At
least in some contexts, informal processes may result in more sensitive
fact-finding. Those who know the parties may have insights about their
intentions and understandings, both critically relevant to determinations
of whether particular conduct is fraudulent, negligent, or merely
mistaken, that would elude a court.226
In light of the potential advantages of informal enforcement, rational
contracting parties will compare the relative costs and benefits of using
nonlegal, as opposed to legal, sanctions when determining whether or
not to disclaim legal liability for fraud through a no-reliance clause.227
V. CONCLUSION
Lies are often wrong. Lies may compromise the autonomy of their
victims, and they may treat their victims unfairly. Moreover, lies may
result in allocational inefficiencies, causing a victim to buy something
224. See generally Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition,
and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817 (1999); David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism and
Spitefulness in Experiments, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 593 (1998); Matthew Rabin,
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993).
225. Some have argued that the introduction of legal constraints may be
counterproductive, by "undermining incentives to develop private cooperative arrangements
and by creating incentives for entrepreneurs to invest in rent seeking." Bruce L. Benson,
Economic Freedom and the Evolution of Law, 18 CATO J. 209, 229 (1998); see also, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and
Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1140 (1997) (arguing that "private
ordering generates substantive legal principles that are superior to those that the state
produces"). Indeed, Larry Ribstein contends that trust is essential to efficient transactions
and that the introduction of legally compulsory contracts may, at least sometimes, be
counterproductive. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 570 (2001). By
providing for the legal enforcement of contracts, the law, he maintains, may "crowd out" the
trust that enhances efficient transactions or even promote distrust. See id. at 576-85.
226. Thomas A. Smith, Equality, Evolution and Partnership Law, 3 J. BIOECONOMICS
99, 110-14 (2001) (discussing the literature and suggesting its application to partnership law).
227. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373, 379-83 (1990).
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that she does not really want, and lies may erode the fabric of trust
essential to cooperative behavior. Based on these generic moralisms, a
majority of courts faced with no-reliance clauses, which effectively give
one or both parties the freedom to lie, either refuse to enforce them
altogether or enforce them only subject to significant limitations.
I have argued, however, that these courts have reached their
conclusion too easily. They presume that no-reliance clauses can serve
no legitimate contract function and thus have no legitimate value. But,
at least in some cases where sophisticated parties contract with one
another, no-reliance clauses can-and do-serve valuable contracting
functions. With the core assumption made by a majority of courts
reluctant to enforce no-reliance clauses dispelled, I suggest that at least
the generic formulations of a moral prohibition against fraud are
insufficient to counterbalance the value gained by autonomous parties
choosing what they rationally believe to be in their best self-interest.
Thus, courts should either enforce no-reliance clauses without
significant restrictions or carefully articulate a more robust moral basis
for a public policy prohibition against such clauses.
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